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Reevaluating Politicized Identity & Notions of an American Political 
Community in the Legal & Political Process 
 
Marvin L. Astrada * 
 
Political identity can be viewed as a “historically and culturally specific 
discursive formation.” 1  
 
“[I]t is in the nature of political identities, camps, teams, and the 
corresponding bundled ideological commitments to threaten ossification and 
stasis . . . . This suggests a challenge and an enormous opportunity; it suggests 
the possibility of politics as more than a set of struggles and commitments 
(read: obligations); it suggests politics as an exploration, a creative enterprise, 
and an adventure.” 2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The twentieth and twenty-first centuries have seen the rise and 
development of what is commonly referred to as “identity politics.” This 
development has profoundly impacted longstanding, traditional notions of a 
single “American” political community and national identity through the 
disruption of legal process and public policy spaces. Identity politics and its 
production of formal, politicized identities as a lodestar for modern 
representational politics has assumed a significant role in the conduct of 
American politics and, more specifically, notions of what constitutes an 
American political community. Politicized identity, as well as competing 
notions of what should constitute a “proper” national political community, 
has found expression and exerted influence on the political and judicial 
system’s law and policy-making capacities.3                                                          
*  Marvin L. Astrada (M.A., Ph.D., Florida International University; J.D., Rutgers University Law 
School; M.A., C.A.S., Wesleyan University; B.A. University of Connecticut) teaches in the Politics & 
History Department at New York University—Washington D.C. 
1  ROSI BRAIDOTTI, THE POST-HUMAN (2013) (ebook), reprinted in THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF THEORY 
AND CRITICISM 2327, 2335 (Vincent B. Leitch et al. eds., 3d ed. 2018) [hereinafter NORTON 
ANTHOLOGY]. 
2  Richard T. Ford, Political Identity as Identity Politics, 1 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT, 53, 57 
(2005). 
3  For a description of what constitutes a judicial system, see generally Sheldon Goldman & Thomas 
P. Jahnige, Eastonian Systems Analysis and Legal Research, 2 RUTGERS-CAM L.J. 285 (1970). “A 
judicial system can be conceptualized as encompassing all interactions in a society involved in the 
authoritative allocation of values by the judicial authorities of specified courts. Values are allocated 
by court decisions, procedural rules and court orders.” Id. at 288. Many cases speak to the impact 
of politicized identity on the political and legal process and broader political community. See 
Obergefell v Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015) (holding that under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and substantive due process the states must provide 
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Presently, identity politics in the United States encapsulates a broad 
range of theories, norms, and practices, ostensibly located in objective, 
universal “shared” group experiences of marginalization and oppression 
based on actual or perceived membership in an identity-based group. In the 
present political and legal context, rather than organizing on explicitly 
sociopolitical or economic belief systems, ideological platforms, or political 
party affiliations, many modern political movements and organizations are 
explicitly embracing formal politicized identity as a basis both for 
participation in and, by virtue of participation, for attempts to define the 
broader national political community.4 The foregoing movements typically 
aim to declare, clarify, reclaim, and secure sundry rights and freedoms 
through the political and legal process. Empowerment and enhancement of a 
specific identity-based constituency that has been historically marginalized 
within the American political community is part of the modus operandi of 
identity-based movements.  
The primacy of the identity group is stressed, prioritized, and utilized 
as the basis for the exercise of power at various levels of the political, legal, 
and socioeconomic hierarchy by elite representatives of a formal identity 
group. Power manifests in the articulation and implementation of select 
identity groups’ goals and interests being represented in political, legal, and 
policy spaces. Power thus manifests in the public sphere as policy constituted 
by government pronouncements backed by the financial and coercive power of 
the State. Such pronouncements are implemented as policy to effectuate, in 
part, interpretations of the general welfare.5 Policy entails a multifaceted 
process where the general welfare is conceptualized, defined, and acted 
upon.6 Within this process, policy spaces can be viewed as “considerations of 
what is expedient for the community.”7 Policy has “consistently, if not always                                                         
marriage licenses to same-sex couples and must recognize marriages that were legally licensed and 
performed in other states); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 745 (2013) (holding that the 
1996 Defense of Marriage Act is unconstitutional); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) 
(overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)); Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 
659 (2000) (holding that the constitutional right to freedom of association allowed the Boy Scouts of 
America (BSA) to exclude a homosexual person from membership in spite of a state law requiring 
equal treatment of homosexuals in public accommodations); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 
(1996) (striking down Colorado's Amendment 2, which denied gays and lesbians protections against 
discrimination); Bowers, 478 U.S. at 189 (holding that consenting adults do not have a 
constitutional right to engage in sodomy in private under Due Process Clause); One, Inc. v. 
Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (considering the issue of free speech rights with respect to 
homosexuality). 
4  See Alex Thompson, 2020 Democrats Are Dramatically Changing the Way They Talk About Race, 
POLITICO (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/11/19/democrats-2020-race-identity-
politics-strategy-1000249. 
5  See Theodore J. Lowi, Four Systems of Policy, Politics, and Choice, 32 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 298 (1972). 
6  See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 35–36 (Paulo J.S. Pereira & Diego M. Beltran 
eds., 2011) (1881). 
7  Id. at 35.  
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explicitly, found authority in peoples’ empirical perspectives about social 
consequences. Its most important contribution has perhaps been . . . that law 
is most fruitfully conceived as decision in the sense of sanctioned 
authoritative choice.”8 
Identity is a formidable basis from which to construct a political, legal, 
and public policy agenda or platform because it gets at the core of what a 
subject perceives itself to be and what its purpose is in the broader political 
community. Indeed, political activity is “animated by efforts to define and 
defend who I am, or we are, or you are, or hope to be, or hope to be seen to 
be.”9 Members—or rather, self-designated or appointed representatives—of 
identity-based constituencies ostensibly assert or reassert ways of explaining 
and understanding a group’s distinctiveness, experiences, history, and 
inclusion and exclusion criteria. The purpose of asserting and propagating a 
reimagined or re-appropriated identity is to directly challenge what are 
deemed mischaracterizations of out-groups’ experiences and status within 
society’s public policy spaces.10 The stated overarching goal of identity-based, 
socio-political agendas, as put forth by representatives of an identity group, is 
usually to obtain greater self-determination, autonomy, rights, and 
recognition of the value and worth of a marginalized group’s experience.11 In 
doing so, politicized identity becomes an exercise of power over subjects, in 
that individual subjects are, to some degree, compelled to surrender their 
autonomy, distinctiveness, complexity, and diversity in service of group-based 
identity factions, politics, and movements for the sake of implementing 
nationalistic public-policy agendas.12  
Identity has become not only a basis for political participation and 
representation, but also a means of obtaining and exercising power among 
identity-group elites in the realms of law and politics. Identity has become a                                                         
8  Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Criteria for a Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 362, 
372 (1971). 
9  Richard D. Parker, Five Theses on Identity Politics, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 545–53 (2005).  
10  See generally ROGERS BRUBAKER, TRANS: GENDER AND RACE IN AN AGE OF UNSETTLED IDENTITIES 
(2016); Rogers M. Smith, Identities, Interests, and the Future of Political Science, 2 PERSPS. ON 
POLITICS 301 (2004). 
11  See Michael Walzer, What Does It Mean to Be an “American?”, 57 SOC. RES. 591 (1990); Nadia 
Suleman, Young Americans Are Increasingly ‘Uncomfortable’ With LGBTQ Community, GLAAD 
Study Shows, TIME (June 25, 2019), https://time.com/5613276/glaad-acceptance-index-lgbtq-
survey/.  
12  From social justice movements anchored by race to artistic expression centering 
legacies of pain and pleasure that shape our racial, cultural, and geographic senses of 
self, identity is on the rise as a tool that animates both self-affirmation and liberation. 
At the same time, identity is prompting severe backlash. From the ‘All Lives Matter’ 
slogans developed in response to the fight against police brutality to the ambitious calls 
for universality in the law, identity politics is characterized as undemocratic, 
exclusionary, and harmful to minoritized identities. 
Osamudia R. James, Valuing Identity, 102 MINN. L. REV. 127, 128 (2017); see also Jessica Knouse, 
From Identity Politics to Ideology Politics, 3 UTAH L. REV. 749, 750 (2009).  
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pursuit of an ideological-political program that directly impacts public policy. 
As an expression of power, identity politics has (1) profoundly impacted the 
fabric of American politics and political culture; (2) affected the political, 
legal, cultural, and socioeconomic reality of those who reside within and 
without classificatory schema based on identity; and (3) has had a formative 
impact on the notion of what comprises an American political community.13  
In light of the foregoing observations, this work critically examines the 
complexity of the politics of identity, politicized identity, and notions of an 
American political community as manifested in the political and legal 
process. More specifically, this work analyzes some of the problems, tensions, 
and effects of politicized identity vis-à-vis positing an American political 
community, as well as the impact that politicized identity has on the 
character and content of inclusive representational politics—the medium by 
which the American political community is framed and posited. This work 
will thus proceed as follows: First, an in-depth analysis of politicized identity 
is conducted to frame the discussion and highlight the complexity that 
undergirds the politics of identity in the political and legal process. Second, 
the enduring problem of identity-based representation and the challenges of 
positing a national political community is considered. Third, the multifaceted 
relationship between law, politics, identity, and representation is examined. 
Fourth, the nuances of politicized identity and the problems that attach to 
employing politicized identity in representative politics are identified and 
critically analyzed. Lastly, a summary of findings and some observations 
pertaining to politicized identity’s role and influence on the political and legal 
process, representational politics, and what constitutes an American political 
community going forward are provided. 
 
I. WHY REEVALUATE POLITICIZED IDENTITY? 
 
A. Politicized Identity & Political Community in Law, Politics & Policy 
 
A systemic, conceptual analysis reveals the problems that exist in the 
political and legal process as far as articulating a nationalistic notion of an                                                         
13  See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 647 (1948) (holding that States cannot explicitly subject 
citizens of Asian descent to unequal treatment under law based solely on race/ethnic classification); 
Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of 
a single racial group are immediately suspect” and are subject to “the most rigid scrutiny.”); Plessy 
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550–51 (1896) (upholding the constitutionality of racial segregation laws 
for public facilities as long as the segregated facilities were equal in quality); The Civil Rights 
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was unconstitutional because 
Congress lacked authority to regulate private affairs under the Fourteenth Amendment; also, the 
Thirteenth Amendment “merely abolishes slavery,” and did not necessarily ban race discrimination 
regarding access to public services); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1876) 
(declaring that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment apply 
only to state action, not to actions by individual citizens). 
2020] Reevaluating Politicized Identity 23 
 
American political community via politicized identity groups. Thus, systemic 
analysis is warranted because of the insight that can be gained concerning 
the overarching political and judicial systems’ ability to confront change and 
persist in light of the severe challenges that each is presently facing in what 
some commentators have termed a crisis in the integrity of the American 
political process and conceptions of a national community.14 Various strains 
of politicized identity have manifested, played a substantial role, and 
persisted in the present political and legal process and in articulations of an 
American political community.15 Politicized identity is a structural variable, 
which persists in the political and judicial systems that contextualize, and 
which are products and producers of, politicized identity.  
[A] principal objective of a political system is to persist—i.e., to 
maintain the ability to allocate values for a society and to 
induce most members to accept these allocations as binding. 
Indeed, the major task of systems analysis is the investigation 
of how the system persists. Persistence is not to be confused 
with maintenance of the status quo. Persistence is an empirical 
concept that recognizes that a static system usually proves to 
be incapable of handling demands and maintaining support in 
the face of dynamically changing social, economic and cultural 
conditions that typify modem societies.16  
Politicized identity has informed the various inputs that place 
demands on the political and legal process’s outputs concerning the character 
and content of an American political community.17 What exactly is a political 
community?18 Who is included, who is excluded, and why? In the present                                                         
14  See generally Fareed Zakaria, Can America Be Fixed: The New Crisis of Democracy, 92 FOREIGN 
AFF. 22 (2013); Jonathan Rauch, How American Politics Went Insane, ATLANTIC (Jun. 21, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/07/how-american-politics-went-insane/485570/; 
Simon Tisdall, American Democracy Is in Crisis, and Not Just Because of Trump, GUARDIAN (Aug. 
7, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/aug/07/american-democracy-crisis-
trump-supreme-court.  
15  See Bharati Mukherjee, Beyond Multiculturalism, in MULTI-AMERICA: ESSAYS ON CULTURAL WARS & 
CULTURAL PEACE 454 (Ishmael Reed ed. 1998); STEPHEN STEINBERG, THE ETHNIC MYTH: RACE, 
ETHNICITY, AND CLASS IN AMERICA (1981). 
16  Goldman & Jahnige, supra note 3, at 289. 
17  A “demand” is defined as “an expression of opinion that an authoritative allocation with 
regard to a particular subject matter should or should not be made by those responsible 
for doing so.” With some political institutions characterizing American politics, 
demands can vary broadly in form and content. A riot, no less than a formal petition, 
may be perceived as a demand. A self-initiated congressional staff study may be used 
as well as presentations by lobbyists. In a judicial system, on the other hand, litigation 
is the principal transmitter of demands.  
Id. at 290. 
18  [W]hat is it for a group of people to share such an identity? Notoriously there is 
considerable disagreement on this question. The most basic difference of opinion is 
between ‘subjectivists,’ who maintain that sharing a national identity is simply a 
matter of people believing that they belong together for some special reason (perhaps 
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milieu of American law and politics, some commentators view the Trump 
Administration as representing authentic values, virtues, and norms that 
should inform an American political community,19 while others find that the 
Administration does not represent the values, norms, and virtues that should 
underpin an American political community.20 Inputs in the form of identity-                                                        
because they believe that they have a distinctive shared culture, history, language, or 
way of life), and ‘objectivists,’ who argue that in order to share a national identity people 
must really possess distinctive common characteristics, such as a shared culture, 
history, language, or way of life.”  
Andrew Mason, Political Community, Liberal‐Nationalism, and the Ethics of Assimilation, 109 
ETHICS 261, 262 (1999); see also Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits 
of Race and Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 263, 266, 282–83 (1995). 
19  Donald Trump is not your regular politician, everyone knows that. But the level of 
opprobrium heaped upon him is astonishing despite that personal sacrifice. It bounces 
off him, of course, because he's a street fighter in the purest sense and brings with him 
a level of ferocity that the political world just can't fathom. Terrorism, rocketing illegal 
immigration, economic conflict with China and others: these are the existential issues 
that leave America in a perilous position in a very dangerous world. Globalism is under 
attack on every continent as a consequence, and it's about time that the United States 
had a president that put the nation first. This is what these times demand and this man 
has our back. Few people know how capable he is in these situations . . . He's intense, 
he's demanding, but it's all driven by his passion to deliver an end product that people 
love . . . his approach is quite simple, really . . . he reflected upon a question that he was 
often asked: “How did you achieve your success?” He gave a simple response, but it was 
one that I still think about often. “I look around, I see what people want and I give it to 
them.” That's the Donald J. Trump mantra: give the people what they want.  
George Sorial & Damian Bates, Opinion, We Know the Real Donald Trump. America Needs Four 
More Years, NEWSWEEK (June 14, 2019), https://www.newsweek.com/trump-sorial-bates-real-deal-
four-more-years-1443862. 
20  We can hear the spectacle of cruel laughter throughout the Trump era. There were the 
border-patrol agents cracking up at the crying immigrant children separated from their 
families, and the Trump adviser who delighted white supremacists when he mocked a 
child with Down syndrome who was separated from her mother. There were the police 
who laughed uproariously when the president encouraged them to abuse suspects, and 
the Fox News hosts mocking a survivor of the Pulse Nightclub massacre (and in the 
process inundating him with threats), the survivors of sexual assault protesting to 
Senator Jeff Flake, the women who said the president had sexually assaulted them, 
and the teen survivors of the Parkland school shooting. There was the president 
mocking Puerto Rican accents shortly after thousands were killed and tens of thousands 
displaced by Hurricane Maria, the black athletes protesting unjustified killings by the 
police, the women of the #MeToo movement who have come forward with stories of 
sexual abuse, and the disabled reporter whose crime was reporting on Trump 
truthfully. It is not just that the perpetrators of this cruelty enjoy it; it is that they enjoy 
it with one another. Their shared laughter at the suffering of others is an adhesive that 
binds them to one another, and to Trump. Taking joy in that suffering is more human 
than most would like to admit. Somewhere on the wide spectrum between adolescent 
teasing and the smiling white men in the lynching photographs are the Trump 
supporters whose community is built by rejoicing in the anguish of those they see as 
unlike them, who have found in their shared cruelty an answer to the loneliness and 
atomization of modern life. The laughter undergirds the daily spectacle of insincerity, 
as the president and his aides pledge fealty to bedrock democratic principles they have 
no intention of respecting. 
Adam Serwer, The Cruelty Is the Point, ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/the-cruelty-is-the-point/572104/. 
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based platforms, frameworks, factions, and discourse have had a substantial 
impact on the political and judicial systems’ outputs in the form of legislation 
and judicial opinions, which directly affect representational politics and 
policy spaces.21 A historical exemplar of the power of politicized identity 
within the larger political and legal process to deeply shape the notion of an 
American political community is evident in the Court’s notorious Dred Scott 
v. Sandford opinion.22 The opinion is a powerful example of how 
constitutional expressions of political identity and political community can 
profoundly affect subjects that reside within the jurisdiction of a political and 
judicial system that posits a national community grounded in the 
fundamental law. The Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford declared, in part, that:  
The words “people of the United States” and “citizens” are 
synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. They both 
describe the political body who, according to our republican 
institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and 
conduct the Government through their representatives. They 
are what we familiarly call the “sovereign people,” and every 
citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of this 
sovereignty. The question before us is, whether the class of 
persons described in the plea in abatement compose a portion 
of this people, and are constituent members of this sovereignty? 
We think they are not, and that they are not included, and were 
not intended to be included, under the word “citizens” in the 
Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and 
privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to 
citizens of the United States. On the contrary, they were at that 
time considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, 
who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether 
emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and 
had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power 
and the Government might choose to grant them.23 
The Court’s opinion highlights the influence that politicized identity 
has on the political and legal process. The remainder of this work, therefore, 
contextualizes and analyzes politicized identity, delves into the enterprise of 
critically evaluating it, and assesses some of the effects that it has on notions 
of an American political community and its expression via representational 
politics. The aim is to contribute to a discourse that seeks to better bridge the 
gaps between theory and practice, to appreciate and gauge the conceptual 
and empirical complexity of politicized identity, to reveal how the conceptual 
directly informs the practice of identity politics, and to highlight and                                                         
21  See DAVID EASTON, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM: AN INQUIRY INTO THE STATE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE (1953).  
22  60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
23  Id. at 404–05. 
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critically analyze the power-effects of politicized identity in the political and 
legal process. An analysis encompassing the foregoing sheds light on the 
importance of a “shared national identity [as] a precondition for the existence 
of the kind of trust which makes compromise possible in the face of 
conflicting interests . . . a shared national identity is a necessary condition for 
a politics of the common good and widespread support for redistribution on 
grounds of social justice.”24  
This work is conceptual in nature as well as comprehensive, in that it 
seeks to analyze the sundry nuances and complexities of identity vis-à-vis 
politics, law, and notions of an American political community. It subscribes to 
Michel Foucault’s characterization of critique:  
A critique does not consist in saying that things aren’t good the 
way they are. It consists in seeing on what types of 
assumptions, of familiar notions, of established, unexamined 
ways of thinking the accepted practices are based . . . . Thought 
does exist, both beyond and before systems and edifices of 
discourse. It is something that is often hidden but always drives 
everyday behaviors. There is always a little thought occurring 
in the most [banal] institutions; there is always thought even in 
silent habits.25  
To identify and critically analyze the power effects and impact of politicized 
identity on law, politics, and policy spaces is the overarching aim of this 
work.  
 
B. Politicized Identity, Representation & American Political Community 
 
Whether politicized identity is pragmatic or inevitable does not exempt 
it from critical appraisal. Identity politics continues to have a profound effect 
on the following: (1) the definition of a national identity—a common will; (2) 
the political, social, and economic actuality of identity groups, sub-groups, 
and individual subjects as expressed in the political and legal process; and (3) 
the notion of a national political community expressed in representational 
politics and public policy spaces. Facets of this examination include an 
assessment of whether politicized identity has had a positive effect by 
providing marginalized groups with increased political power, or instead a 
negative effect by reducing politics to identity-based meta-ideologies that 
artificially constrain complex and diverse individuals. In the process of 
investigating these facets, this article explores the notion that politicized 
identity may not be an effective basis for an inclusive national political                                                         
24  Mason, supra note 18, at 263. 
25  MICHEL FOUCAULT, So Is It Important to Think?, in THE ESSENTIAL FOUCAULT: SELECTIONS FROM 
ESSENTIAL WORKS OF FOUCAULT, 1954–84 (Paul Rabinow & Nikolas S. Rose eds., 1994). 
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community, and that it may not be conducive to fostering an American 
political community based on democratic representation because, as David 
Easton notes, “‘[P]olitical community’ implies ‘at the very least that the 
members of the system show some minimal readiness or ability to continue 
working together to solve their political problems.’”26  
Politicized identity, like most human constructs, has both positive and 
negative effects, depending on the lenses one employs to assess and posit 
notions of identity and the common will—and weal—of a political 
community.27 For example, as one critic of the #MeToo movement’s rallying 
cry “Believe All Women” notes: “There are limits to relying on ‘believe all 
women’ as an organizing political principle.”28 As noted by a commentator on 
the state of social science during the US bicentennial, it is possible that 
subjects can become immured in the very device created to purportedly “free” 
them.29 Whether or not this is the case, this article contends that identity, in 
and of itself, is an influential factor in the articulation and practice of power 
in the political and legal process, the public sphere, and the American 
political community. Indeed, the successful use of identity in politics has been 
“fundamentally rooted in a command of public ideas . . . [written into] not 
                                                        
26  Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Public Opinion and the United States Supreme Court: 
Mapping of Some Prerequisites for Court Legitimation of Regime Changes, 2 L. & SOC'Y REV. 357, 
357 n.1 (1968) (quoting David Easton, A System Analysis of Political Life (1965)); see also Roy L. 
Brooks, Race as an Under-Inclusive and Over-Inclusive Concept, 1 AFR. AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 9, 20 
(1994) (“[T]he traditional civil rights concept of race . . . ignores significant internal divisions of 
socioeconomic class, gender, politics, sexual orientation, disability, race-gender intersectionality . . . 
and other inter-sectionalities.”); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 
42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990). 
27  There is, first, no such thing as a uniquely determined common good that all people 
could agree on or be made to agree on by the force of rational argument. This is due not 
primarily to the fact that some people may want things other than the common good 
but to the much more fundamental fact that to different individuals and groups the 
common good is bound to mean different things. This fact, hidden from the utilitarian 
by the narrowness of his outlook on them world of human valuations, will introduce 
rifts on questions of principle which cannot be reconciled by rational argument because 
ultimate values—our conceptions of what life and what society should be—are beyond 
the range of mere logic. They may be bridged by compromise in some cases but not in 
others. Americans who say, ‘‘We want this country to arm to its teeth and then to fight 
for what we conceive to be right all over the globe’’ and Americans who say, ‘‘We want 
this country to work out its own problems which is the only way it can serve humanity’’ 
are facing irreducible differences of ultimate values which compromise could only maim 
and degrade. 
Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, in THE DEMOCRACY 
SOURCEBOOK 6 (Robert Dahl, Ian Shapiro, & Jose Antonio Cheibub eds., 2003) (discussing 
of the complexities and tensions underpinning notions of a common will in a political 
community premised on democratic representation).  
28  Bari Weiss, Opinion, The Limits of ‘Believe All Women,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/28/opinion/metoo-sexual-harassment-believe-women.html.  
29  See LOUIS SCHNEIDER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN AMERICA: THE FIRST TWO HUNDRED YEARS 210 (Charles M. 
Bonjean, Louis Schneider, & Robert L. Lineberry eds., 1976). 
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only public law but into the national consciousness.”30 It is identity’s power to 
do this in the context of law and representational politics that is the focus of 
this analysis. 
Representation, in the American political context, has found unique 
and, at times, counter-intuitive expression in politics, law, and public 
policy.31 For instance, although representation is the lodestar of the 
American constitutional order, the original framework explicitly excluded a 
plethora of identity-based groups, such as Black slaves, women, and 
American Indians.32 In the modern context, the American constitutional 
order continues to suffer from representational deficiency, for example, vis-à-
vis the vote based on racial and class status and disparity considerations.33 
From a political process perspective, representation, in conjunction with 
politicized identity and the notion of a “proper” American political 
community, may be “the most interesting, the most complex, the most 
baffling aspect of any democratic political system, namely, the ascertainment 
of public feeling on innumerable public policy issues through the medium of 
periodic, partisan selection of district delegates to a multi-membered 
representative assembly.”34 Ultimately, the present state of American politics 
necessitates an analysis of the very notion of representation—a seemingly 
obvious concept that is actually quite complicated and dependent on the 
interpretations of different identity-based factions. In the present identity 
politics that undergirds the American political system and political culture, it 
is important to revisit and reassess the notion of representation in light of the 
powerful role that politicized identity has played since the 2016 election. 
What does it signify exactly? The signifier of representation seems to be very 
different as far as the signifier that identity-based factions seek to                                                         
30  CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER, Ronald Reagan, in THE POINT OF IT ALL: A LIFETIME OF GREAT LOVES AND 
ENDEAVORS 9, 11 (Daniel Krauthammer ed., 2018). 
31  Group-based rights means ‘representational’ group-based rights, or group rights that 
assume a sameness of identity among all persons of a designated group. Such rights, 
which include social group representation in deliberative political bodies, certain kinds 
of affirmative action programs, and race-based legislative districting, are distinct from 
group-based strategies that do not implicate identity, such as affirmative action 
programs that are justified by, for example, the utilitarian goal of achieving a less race-
conscious society.  
Anita L. Krug, Note, The Myth of Context in Politics and Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1292, 1292 n.1 
(1997).  
32  See Rick Hubbard, Restoring Citizen Representation in Our Democratic Republic: Congress Is 
Lagging—Do We Have the Will to Force Change?, 40 VT. B.J. 20, 20 (2014). 
33  See Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018) (holding that the District Court disregarded 
presumption of legislative good faith and improperly reversed burden of proof in a case where the 
evidence was insufficient to establish that the Texas Legislature acted in bad faith and engaged in 
intentional discrimination when it adopted interim redistricting plan approved by the district 
court).  
34  Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Reapportionment Perspectives: What Is Fair Representation?, 51 A.B.A. J. 319, 
319 (1965). 
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reconfigure or appropriate. The problem with politicized identity and 
representation may be that it has the potential to easily fall into ideological 
dogma, which can have an adverse impact on the character and content of 
representation.35 
Although it may provide or seem to provide short or long term 
satisfaction for what many may feel is a corrupt political system that has 
oppressed groups based on identity traits and status, identity-based factions 
may or may not be a less-than-effective basis upon which to engage in 
representational politics since politicized identities are “historically created 
and historically variable categories.”36 The “I believe” approach, grounded in 
an explicitly politicized identity—for instance, wherein belief without any 
form of “objective” or empirical evidence may be sufficient to sustain an 
allegation of serious misconduct— demonstrates why it is important to assess 
how representation and political community manifest in the political and 
legal process and in policy spaces.  
Politicized identity plays a key role in contouring the form and 
substance of what constitutes a political community. Bertrand Russell’s 
analysis of the political economy of labor can be applied to politicized identity. 
Russell opines that “[t]he uniting purpose exists only in owners and 
managers” of politicized identity signifiers “and may be completely absent in 
most of those” subjects who are encompassed within a politicized identity 
signifier.37 It is important to note that this pitfall applies to politicized 
identity in general; race, ethnicity, sexuality, class, religion, and ideology are 
exemplars of politicized identity signifiers that all have the potential of 
negatively impacting the form and substance of representational politics.38 As 
expressed in a recent editorial:  
The huntresses’ war cry—“believe all women”—has felt like a 
bracing corrective to a historic injustice. It has felt like a 
justifiable response to a system in which the crimes perpetrated 
against women—so intimate, so humiliating and so unlike any                                                         
35  See Athena D. Mutua, Shifting Bottoms and Rotating Centers: Reflections on LatCrit III and the 
Black/White Paradigm, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1177, 1182–83 (1999). According to some critics, 
“single issues, fixed ideas, [and] single-minded ideologies are dangerous” for the integrity of 
representational politics. CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER, Thank You, Isaiah Berlin, in THE POINT OF IT 
ALL: A LIFETIME OF GREAT LOVES AND ENDEAVORS, supra note 30, at 15.   
36  Rogers Brubaker & Frederick Cooper, Beyond “Identity,” 29 THEORY & SOC’Y 14, 30 (2000). It has 
been contended that, because identity politics “are premised on exclusion from a universal ideal,” 
politicized identity requires “that ideal, as well as their exclusion from it, for their own perpetuity 
as identities . . . identity structured by this ethos becomes deeply invested in its own impotence, 
even while it seeks to assuage the pain of its powerlessness through its vengeful moralizing, 
through its wide distribution of suffering, through its reproach of power as such.” Wendy Brown, 
Wounded Attachments, 21 POL. THEORY 390, 398, 403 (1993). 
37  BERTRAND RUSSELL, AUTHORITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL 65–66 (1949). 
38  See generally Samara Klar, The Influence of Competing Identity Primes on Political Preferences, 75 
J. POLS. 1108 (2013). 
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other—are so very difficult to prove. But I also can’t shake the 
feeling that this mantra creates terrible new problems in 
addition to solving old ones.39  
Rigid ideological dogma, the antithesis of a rational rule-based approach to 
fostering, enhancing, and sustaining representational democratic politics and 
public policy, may have long-term adverse effects on the integrity of 
representation.40 
 
II. POLITICIZED IDENTITY: AN INITIAL ANALYSIS 
 
A. The Political & the Legal: Identity & Political Community 
 
The importance of analyzing politicized identity vis-à-vis political 
community is that understanding “‘the claims of community’—whether in law 
or moral and political theory—is to recognize that, as the phrase itself 
suggests, more than one claim is involved.”41 Accordingly, the notion of 
community rests on contested terrain. Politicized identity is both product and 
producer of an unstable conceptual communitarian terrain.42 In its Dred Scott 
opinion, for instance, the Court noted that:                                                         
39  Weiss, supra note 28. In the case of the “believing all women” standard for adjudging allegations of 
sexual misconduct, generally and specifically, Weiss also suggests that such a posture: 
can rapidly be transmogrified into an ideological orthodoxy that will not serve women 
at all. If the past few weeks have shown us the unique horrors some women have faced, 
the answer to it can’t be a stringent new solidarity that further limits the definition of 
womanhood and lumps [women’s] highly diverse experiences together simply based on 
our gender. I don’t think that helps women. Or men. I believe that the “believe all 
women” vision of feminism unintentionally fetishizes women. Women are no longer 
human and flawed. They are Truth personified. They are above reproach. I believe that 
it’s condescending to think that women and their claims can’t stand up to interrogation 
and can’t handle skepticism. I believe that facts serve feminists far better than faith. 
That due process is better than mob rule. 
Id.  
40  See Peter H. Schuck, Against (And For) Madison: An Essay in Praise of Factions, 15 YALE L. & 
POL'Y REV. 553, 568–69 (1996). 
41  Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community, 90 MICH. L. REV. 685, 688 
(1992). 
42  Perusing innumerable definitions, one discovers that democracy has become an altar 
on which everyone hangs his or her favorite ex voto. Almost all normatively desirable 
aspects of political, and sometimes even of social and economic, life are credited as 
intrinsic to democracy: representation, accountability, equality, participation, justice, 
dignity, rationality, security, freedom . . . the list goes on. We are repeatedly told that 
“unless democracy is x or generates x . . . .” The ellipsis is rarely spelled out, but it 
insinuates either that a system in which governments are elected is not worthy of being 
called ‘‘democracy’’ unless x is fulfilled or that democracy in the minimal sense will not 
endure unless x is satisfied.  
Adam Przeworski, Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense, in THE DEMOCRACY 
SOURCEBOOK 12 (Robert A. Dahl, Ian Shapiro, & Jose Antonio Cheibub eds., 2003). 
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It is very clear, therefore, that no State can, by any act or law 
of its own, passed since the adoption of the Constitution, 
introduce a new member into the political community created 
by the Constitution of the United States. It cannot make him a 
member of this community by making him a member of its own. 
And for the same reason it cannot introduce any person, or 
description of persons, who were not intended to be embraced 
in this new political family, which the Constitution brought into 
existence, but were intended to be excluded from it.43  
The Court’s notions of political community were reconfigured after the 
Civil War, yet a perusal of the latest local and national news media indicates 
the United States continues to struggle with who and what constitutes an 
American political community.44 Political community, though nationalistic in 
nature at the level of high politics, nonetheless has manifold localistic claims 
as to what constitutes community rather than there being a singular, 
authentic political community that all subjects must conform to. Multiple 
claims made by various subcommunities within the polity, which characterize 
the politics of politicized identity, may therefore be in line with a fragmented 
yet functional overarching political community that is defined less by what it 
has in common and more by the diversity of differences that permeate the 
multiplicity of communitarian-based claims.  
Identity, like claims of community, is dynamic. It provides the context 
for the political and legal process and involves a continual negotiation 
between representation and actual policy spaces, such as judicial opinions or 
legislative acts.45 Such policy spaces assume a “real” quality, providing 
tangible, functional, but malleable concepts and ideational frameworks to 
ground and structure a sense of authentic identity and community.46 Notions 
of self are defined in policy spaces drawn, in turn, from cultural ordering 
mechanisms such as religion, nationalism, patriotism, political and economic                                                         
43  Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 406 (1857). 
44  See, e.g., Katie Rogers & Nicholas Fandos, Trump Tells Congresswomen to ‘Go Back’ to the 
Countries They Came From, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/14/us/politics/trump-twitter-squad-congress.html. 
45  See PHILIP E. STEINBERG, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE OCEAN 207 (2001). 
46  Many writers go further and characterize liberal assumptions about value consensus as 
devious and repressive. The dominant groups in society, on this view, universalize their 
interests and experience and repress the self-expression of groups (e.g. women and minorities) 
without power. According to Robert Gordon, one can represent law as a legitimating ideology 
in the view that “[t]he ruling class induces consent and demobilizes opposition by masking its 
role in widely shared utopian norms and fair procedures, which it then distorts to its own 
purposes” . . . Gordon himself seems to proffer an account wherein these preferences are 
concealed even from the actors themselves because “[t]he discourse of law-its categories, 
arguments, reasoning modes, rhetorical tropes, and procedural rituals-fits into a complex of 
discursive practices that together structure how people perceive.  
Thomas Morawetzt, Understanding Disagreement—The Root Issue of Jurisprudence: Applying 
Wittgenstein To Positivism, Critical Theory & Judging, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 375, n.5 (1992-1993).  
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systems, norms, morals and values, and most importantly, formal politicized 
identity.47 Policy spaces, such as judicial opinions, situate subjects in the 
world; they provide contextual parameters that shape the contours of human 
experience, which provides a fulcrum by which experience is translated into 
an identarian placeholder for a subject’s self-perception. Humans construct 
identity via their interactions and their external experiences with and in 
space-places, wherein “authentic” meaning resides.48 Policy spaces enable the 
transposition of internal, subjective, and human psychical processes onto the 
external world.  
Identity—wherein it can be grasped and contemplated, rendered 
constative, concretized and communicated—assumes a cardinal role in the 
constitution of human affairs. Multifaceted experiences provide fodder for the 
transformation of identity into a political medium, effectively creating 
attachments that, in turn, provide meaning for subjects.49 Identity is 
culturally mediated, as are the socialization processes utilized by politicized 
identity groups to procure attachment and fidelity to the political, ideological, 
and normative agendas advanced by the elite within a politicized identity 
group.50 The trappings of politicized identity involve the potential for it to 
become an exclusive means of comprehending and understanding authentic 
identity in the political milieu.51 The act of authoritatively naming creates 
meaning and subjective attachment. Identity enables subjective attachments 
to political agenda and ideological interpretations of group interests, goals, 
and the “proper” means by which to obtain these goals. A pitfall of relying 
upon formal politicized identity groups in a representative democratic 
political system may be that the foregoing can have the potential effect of 
restricting subjects to fit within the parameters of the identity, or that the 
interpretation of identity by certain elite representatives does not necessarily 
reflect the actual subjects that are emplaced in the identity signifier.52  
 
                                                         
47  Id.  
48  See generally YI-FU TUAN, SPACE AND PLACE: THE PERSPECTIVE OF EXPERIENCE (1977). 
49  See Peter Berkowitz, The Court, the Constitution, and the Culture of Freedom, POL’Y REV., Aug.–
Sept. 2005, at 3, 23, https://www.hoover.org/research/court-constitution-and-culture-freedom. 
50  See generally BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGINS AND 
SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (3d ed. 2006). 
51  See Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community, 90 MICH. L. REV. 685, 688 
(1992). 
52  See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141–42 (1873) (“The paramount destiny and mission of 
woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. 
And the rules of civil society must be adapted to the general constitution of things, and cannot be 
based upon exceptional cases.”); MONA DOMOSH & JONI SEAGER, PUTTING WOMEN IN PLACE: 
FEMINIST GEOGRAPHERS MAKE SENSE OF THE WORLD (2001); Scott B. Astrada & Marvin L. 
Astrada, Being Latino in the 21st Century: Reexamining Politicized Identity & the Problem of 
Representation, 20 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 245 (2017). 
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B. Politicized Identity, Political Community & Representation 
 
The notion of an American political community based on 
representation, despite distorted beginnings, is at the heart of American 
democratic politics. Political community and representation are key to 
American politics because of the role community norms, values, and other 
ordering principles play in the articulation of public policy.53 Political 
community is underpinned by politicized identities, plays a formative role 
because it functions as: (1) a causal factor in the constitution of personal 
identity; (2) a particular substantive value; and (3) a source of general, 
metaethical value.54 In the American case, it may be more constructive to 
view an American political community as being composed of various sub-
communities that seek to generate and disseminate political identity-based 
knowledge through formal politicized identity discourse. This is significant 
because political knowledge answers the following question:  
What is the meaning and purpose of this association? What is 
the appropriate structure of our community and government? 
Even if we assume that there are right answers to these last 
questions . . . it is nevertheless the case that there will be as 
many right answers as there are communities.55  
It is certainly the case that identity is a key aspect of our political and 
judicial systems. “Identity cannot exist without representation . . . . 
Individuals can often communicate certain kinds of identity, such as race, 
without conscious action. Other kinds of identity, such as religion, are 
typically invisible. But even individuals with visible identities can 
communicate consciously chosen messages of group pride and dissent.”56  
It is an inescapable fact that the individual functions within the 
context of groups—factions, as James Madison would have it—in the 
American political system and legal process. “Representative government is a 
process of accommodating group interests through democratic institutional                                                         
53  See Woodrow Wilson, Address at the Daughters of the American Revolution 25th Anniversary: 
America First (Oct. 11, 1915), in AMERICA FIRST: PATRIOTIC READINGS 75, 76–77 (Jasper L. McBrien 
ed., 1916), [https://archive.org/details/americafirst00mcbrrich]; George Washington, Farewell 
Address (Sept. 19, 1796), in AMERICA FIRST, at 94, 96. 
54  Mason, supra note 18, at 269. 
55  Michael Walzer, Philosophy and Democracy, 9 POL. THEORY 379, 393 (1981). 
56  Claims of equality based on identities of difference are intrinsically a kind of protest . . 
. Identity claims in law arise not merely from a social context in which a particular 
group shares a certain history, culture, or status. Underlying that kind of identity is a 
shared viewpoint, not a set of opinions or a viewpoint specific to any particular topic or 
issue, but ‘view-point’ in a more literal, basic sense: a shared point of view, a shared 
position from which one's views emerge. 
Nan D. Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissent for Equality, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 1, 5 (2000). 
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arrangements . . . to insure effective representation . . . by a realistic 
accommodation of the diverse and often conflicting political forces operating 
within the State.”57 Accommodation has been a fundamental ordering 
principle in the constitutional system. One major change observed in the 
notion of representation is the shift from a historical focus on liberty to 
equality and inclusion in the present.  
Just as, in the earlier days of anarchy, the most thoughtful men 
worshipped law, so during the period of increasing State power 
there was a tendency to worship liberty . . . the impulse toward 
liberty, however, seems now to have lost much of its force . . . it 
has been replaced by the love of equality.58  
This shift has noteworthy consequences for how identity-based politics and 
factions manifest in thought and practice. Indeed, equality in the form of 
inclusion—a driving force of identity-based factions—is in line with and has 
facilitated the power of formal identity-based groups as opposed to a liberty 
ethos focused on politics and policy.59 The consequential impact that formal 
identity groups have on the political and legal process renders them, in 
essence, identity-based factions, which thrive by priming or activating certain 
identities in the electorate to support or reject specific policy agendas as well 
as credit or discredit particular politicos or parties.60 
Representation in both the political realm and legal process is quite 
complex, especially in a nation of millions of people. It can be viewed in 
different ways, such as in a universalist or pluralistic community-based 
framework, which results in very distinctive paradigms for characterizing 
representation.61 Representation in the United States is profoundly                                                         
57  Lucas v. Colo. Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 749 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
58  BERTRAND RUSSELL, AUTHORITY & THE INDIVIDUAL 29 (1949). 
59  See Fredric Jameson, Foreword to JEAN FRANÇOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT 
ON KNOWLEDGE, at vii, xiv–xvii (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., 1984); Paul Patton, 
Introduction to JEAN BAUDRILLARD, THE GULF WAR DID NOT TAKE PLACE 1, 5–7 (Paul Patton trans., 
1995); Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 61–63 (1984); Damen 
Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory & 
Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REV. 561 (1997). 
60  See Samara Klar, The Influence of Competing Identity Primes on Political Preferences, 75 J. POL. 
1108, 1108–24 (2013). 
61  For instance, regarding the relationship between representation, the rule of law, and its 
application in society:  
The liberal focus on the individual presupposes difference among citizens: because 
individual ends are not homogeneous, they are incompatible with the existence of an 
overarching common end. But the universalist assumption at the base of liberal thought 
is that, because humans are identical in their status as moral beings, moral obligation 
cannot be contingent on individual attributes, merits, or circumstances. The liberal 
conception of the moral equality of persons requires that law have universal 
application: it must treat all persons identically and disinterestedly, and its grant of 
rights and liberties must extend to all persons in the polity.  
Krug, supra note 31, at 1294. 
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challenging given the diversity and difference that permeates the national 
landscape. Difference permeates norms, values, morals, and other ideational 
ordering mechanisms that enable a group or groups of people to effectively 
cohere around a stable and universalizable set of ordering concepts and 
principles, such as the rule of law. When it comes to politics, it is important to 
keep in mind Bertrand Russell’s admonition: 
[P]olitics, economics, and social organization generally, belong 
in the realm of means, not ends. Our political and social 
thinking is prone to what may be called the “administrator's 
fallacy,” by which I mean the habit of looking upon society as a 
systematic whole, of a sort that is thought good if it is pleasant 
to contemplate as a model of order. . . . But a society does not, 
or at least should not, exist to satisfy an external survey, but to 
bring a good life to the individuals who compose it. It is in the 
individuals, not in the whole, that ultimate value is to be 
sought. A good society is a means to a good life for those who 
compose it, not something having a separate kind if excellence 
on its own account.62  
Identity-based factions and formal politicized identity may or may not 
be less than effective at keeping the aforementioned distinctions apart, due in 
part to the existential trappings of articulating politics through the lens of 
identity—the basis for one’s conception of Self, Other, and World.63 The 
complex of principles, rules, ethos, and representative elite actors that 
propagate, enforce, interpret, and apply them is essential to asserting the 
propriety of an authoritative configuration of a politicized identity. Politicized 
identity factions seem to bestride the divide between universal and 
particularistic notions of political community. A universal interpretation of 
an American political community may “have the effect of enforcing a singular 
over a pluralist truth, that is, of reiterating the structure of the ideal 
commonwealth in every previously particularist community . . . [and thereby 
have the effect of] repressing internal political processes.”64 A pluralistic sub-
community’s view may also have the effect of propagating a “singular over a 
pluralist truth”65 as far as the constitution of “authentic” identities and the 
“correct” legal and political expression of identities in American politics.  
                                                        
62  RUSSELL, supra note 58, at 87.  
63  See Louis Althusser, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Ben Brewster trans.), in NORTON 
ANTHOLOGY, supra note 1, at 1285, 1292; see also MICHEL FOUCAULT, ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 
AND THE DISCOURSE ON LANGUAGE (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans., 1972); JEAN-FRANÇOIS LYOTARD & 
JEAN-LOUP THÉBAUD, JUST GAMING, (Wlad Godzich trans., 1999); LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, CULTURE 
& VALUE, (G.H. von Wright & Heikki Nyman eds., Peter Winch trans., 1980). 
64  Walzer, supra note 55, at 393, 395. 
65  JOHN RAWLS, 3 PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE II: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS OF LEADING POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHERS 328 (Chandran Kukathas ed., 2003). 
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Representation, in thought and practice, has been subject to critique as 
an optimal or genuine state of affairs regarding the American political 
process and system. For instance, it has been argued: 
[T]he grounding of normative political theory in universalist 
premises has been confronted by a recognition that the specific 
needs of blacks, women, and homosexuals, among others, 
cannot be addressed by the universalist principles of equal 
individual rights and ostensibly equal opportunities. This 
recognition of difference within the political community 
necessitates consideration of the group. To the extent that 
many individuals have been discriminated against or 
subordinated because of their shared differences, individual 
differences become group differences, which in turn usher in 
the concept of group rights as a means of tempering liberal 
universalism.66  
It has also been contended that “[o]ur political system is unfair to ethnic, 
political and other minorities. The system cannot provide representative 
fairness because it is ‘winner take all’ and defective in its foundation. The 
only solution is proportional representation, which will provide majority rule 
and fair minority representation.”67 Representation is, or rather should be, 
much more substantive than mere procedural processes or guarantees of “an 
electoral system characterized by at-large elections in which the seats are 
divided among parties and/or individuals in proportion to the number of votes 
received by each.”68 Whether one subscribes to a procedural or a more 
substantive view of representational politics, it seems to be the case that  
no theory of representation is universally valid. Interests are 
important and like-minded groups should be allowed to speak 
as a unified voice. At the same time, we do not dare let those 
interests govern completely . . . . The compromise [embedded in 
the core value/norm of accommodation] recognizes the 
difference in theories of representation, and it also recognizes 
the presence of diverse interests . . . our need to accommodate 
intensifies. Which interests shall be represented? . . . And which 
theory of representation do we then embrace? One that 
guarantees absolute equality of votes as measured by 
population? One that proportions votes by ethnicity? By 
geography? By occupation? Whatever the answer, it will . . .                                                         
66  Krug, supra note 31, at 1295. 
67  Henry Sanders & Rose M. Sanders, Should the U.S. Constitution Be Amended to Require 
Proportional Representation: Arguments For and Against, 5 N.Y. L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 345, 345 
(1988). 
68  John R. Low-Beer, The Constitutional Imperative of Proportional Representation, 94 YALE L.J. 163, 
164 n.4 (1984) (characterizing proportional representation systems). 
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depend on someone, somehow accommodating diverse 
interests.69 
Representation is part of an overarching system of law and politics, 
institutional and ideational. Politicized identity and identity-based factions 
influence representation systemically in that each functions as and in a 
“system of knowledge” that establishes “an accepted grid for filtering”70 
political thought and mobilization of subjects under the banner of an identity-
based faction’s interpretation of what constitutes an identity and its interests 
in policy spaces.71 Politicized identity and the positing of an American 
political community are subject to the ebb and flow of the different goals 
underpinning notions, or rather interpretations of political community—that 
is, “between respecting and fostering the particular and diverse values of 
different individual communities (whatever those values happen to be) on the 
one hand, and fostering the (single) value of substantive community, on the 
other.”72  
Authority in the form of identarian-based elites plays a significant role 
in manufacturing formal identity-based factions and helps create policy 
spaces for subjects to dwell in as far as providing perceptive and cognitive 
apparatuses to explain and understand the relationship between Self, Other, 
and World.73 Authority and the discourse it promulgates are the result of 
carefully selected, de-emphasized, marginalized, and included or excluded 
facets of a politicized identity put forth by an identity-based faction—one                                                         
69  John Moeller, The Supreme Court's Quest for Fair Politics, 1 CONST. COMMENT. 203, 205 (1994). 
Note that the Court, in articulating its equal protection jurisprudence, has explicitly privileged an 
overarching American political value that is embedded in the socio-cultural superstructure of the 
American political community, i.e., individualism. The “rights created by the first section of the 
Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The rights established are 
personal rights.” Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948); see also Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 
633, 663 (1948); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); McCabe v. Atchison, 
Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co., 235 U.S. 151, 161–62 (1914). 
70  EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM 14 (1978). 
71 [G]roup rights fail to be anti-essentialist because they implicitly affirm the essentialist 
presumption that all persons of a particular race or gender share a common identity 
outside the context of discrimination; the substantive approach to adjudication that 
group rights imply likewise fails to be anti-essentialist because it too relies on a 
conception of unified group identity. This implies that substantive jurisprudence fails 
to be anti-universalist as well: like universal individual rights and rule-bound formal 
jurisprudence, substantive jurisprudence screens out important aspects of substance, 
context, and identity. 
Krug, supra note 31, at 1292–93.  
72  Mason, supra note 18, at 699. 
73  There is nothing mysterious or natural about authority. It is formed, irradiated, 
disseminated; it is instrumental, it is persuasive; it has status, it establishes canons of 
taste and value; it is virtually indistinguishable from certain ideas it dignifies [and 
signifies] as true, and from traditions, perceptions, and judgements it forms, transmits, 
and reproduces . . . All these attributes of authority apply to [politicized identity]. 
SAID, supra note 70, at 19–20. 
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which is promulgated by elite gatekeepers.74 “Every political judgment helps 
to modify the facts on which it is passed. Political thought is itself a form of 
political action.”75 Purpose is the condition of thought that gives rise to any 
system of knowledge—it becomes fused with analysis to form a “single 
process”76 of inquiry and understanding. Politicized identity-based factions, 
therefore, create knowledge systems that, in turn, inform the political and 
legal process underpinning policy spaces.   
Representation, at a rudimentary level of analysis, in the U.S. political 
system is based on accommodation.  
This has been true in the United States at least since Madison 
persuaded his fellow participants at the Constitutional 
Convention that a large republic would be preferable to a small 
one. Besides the ‘various and unequal distribution of property,’ 
individuals differ in their wants and needs, in their fortunes, 
and in their opinions about religion and government. These 
differences lead people to form groups—Madison calls them 
factions—that seek their own gain at the expense of others. 
Whether or not increasing the size of the republic solves the 
problem, it does increase the number of groups and competing 
interests, as well as the need for some kind of accommodation.77  
A problem that emerges between representation and politicized identity is 
that politics becomes susceptible to a high degree of ideological agitation that, 
in turn, has the potential to negatively affect the public sphere within which 
democratic discourse takes place.78 This state of affairs, however, may be 
mitigated if politicized identity is viewed as a limited, functional, and 
expedient means by which to communicate the pluralistic needs, interests, 
and goals of a political sub-community that is integral to the nationalist 
notion of an American political community. From a universalist perspective,                                                         
74  Social movements founded on identity politics generate claims based on shared identity 
characteristics in order to gain access to public and private domains. In our political 
life, identity politics is interwoven with dissent—is understood as dissent. Virtually all 
of the American civil rights movements since World War II have embodied the harmony 
between identity and dissent that exists in social practice, if not in law. 
Hunter, supra note 56, at 1–2 (2000). 
75  E.H. CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS CRISIS 5 (1964).  
76  Id. at 4. 
77  John Moeller, The Supreme Court's Quest for Fair Politics, 1 CONST. COMMENT. 203, 205 (1994); see 
also THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (defining a faction as: “[A] number of citizens, 
whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some 
common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the 
permanent and aggregate interests of the community”). 
78  See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, IDENTITY: THE DEMAND FOR DIGNITY AND THE POLITICS OF RESENTMENT 116 
(2018) (“[T]he preoccupation with identity has clashed with the need for deliberative discourse. The 
focus on lived experience by identity groups valorizes inner selves experienced emotionally rather 
than examined rationally.”).  
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however, it may be the case that the public sphere does not effectively 
accommodate debate in the true sense of the term when employing politicized 
identity because politicized identity, at least on one extreme of the spectrum, 
as the basis of politics, may have the effect of “stopping debate altogether.”79  
From a universalist view of an American political community, the 
potential of politicized identity to shut down and constrain public discourse 
on policy can lead to the establishment of this/that binaries as far as correct 
and incorrect modalities of expressing a group’s legal and political 
perceptions of policy discourse and spaces. In the legal realm, the Court has 
struggled with the dichotomy of singular versus multifarious views of 
political community, seeming to borrow from one then the other or fusing the 
two together in a confused effort to provide comprehensive and universal 
legal definitions of an American political community.80 Take, for instance, the 
Court’s reasoning regrading representation in the political process:  
[R]epresentative government is in essence self-government 
through the medium of elected representatives of the people, 
and each and every citizen has an inalienable right to full and 
effective participation in the political processes of his State's 
legislative bodies. Most citizens can achieve this participation 
only as qualified voters through the election of legislators to 
represent them. Full and effective participation by all citizens                                                         
79  KRAUTHAMMER, supra note 30, at 142. “Universal approaches to equality are informed by a 
movement away from identity groups as forming the baseline for anti-discrimination and equality 
law. As such, all individuals, without reference to their identity, are guaranteed a set of rights, 
benefits, or protections.” Osamudia R. James, Valuing Identity, 102 MINN. L. REV. 127, 164 (2017); 
see also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Preventing Balkanization or Facilitating Racial Domination: A 
Critique of the New Equal Protection, 22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1 (2015). 
80  The difficulties with singular versus multifarious views of political community, individualism, and 
the group is exemplified by the Court’s judgment and reasoning in Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 
447 (1970) (holding that because a public park could not be operated on racially discriminatory 
basis, the intention of testator who left property in trust for creating a public park for exclusive use 
of white people could not be fulfilled and that the trust property therefore reverted to heirs of 
testator, the Georgia court’s refusal to apply cy pres doctrine to override the testator’s will did not 
violate Black citizens’ Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process). The 
Court noted:  
Petitioners also advance a number of considerations of public policy in opposition to the 
conclusion which we have reached. In particular, they regret, as we do, the loss of the 
Baconsfield trust to the City of Macon, and they are concerned lest we set a precedent 
under which other charitable trusts will be terminated. It bears repeating that our 
holding today reaffirms the traditional role of the States in determining whether or not 
to apply their cy pres doctrines to particular trusts. Nothing we have said here prevents 
a state court from applying its cy pres rule in a case where the Georgia court, for 
example, might not apply its rule. More fundamentally, however, the loss of charitable 
trusts such as Baconsfield is part of the price we pay for permitting deceased persons 
to exercise a continuing control over assets owned by them at death. This aspect of 
freedom of testation, like most things, has its advantages and disadvantages. The 
responsibility of this Court, however, is to construe and enforce the Constitution and 
laws of the land as they are and not to legislate social policy on the basis of our own 
personal inclinations. (emphasis added). 
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in state government requires, therefore, that each citizen have 
an equally effective voice in the election of members of his state 
legislature. Modern and viable state government needs, and the 
Constitution demands, no less. . . . And the concept of equal 
protection has been traditionally viewed as requiring the 
uniform treatment of persons standing in the same relation to 
the governmental action questioned or challenged.81  
Despite attempts to provide inclusive and far-ranging legal and 
constitutional criteria, American law and society continue to struggle with 
implementing universalist-type pronouncements concerning the character 
and content of the polity.82                                                          
81  Reynolds v. Sims 377 U.S. 533, 565–66 (1964). Yet, representation suffers from a severe deficit in 
our historical and present politics. Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Utah v. Strieff discusses this 
deficit in light of the criminal law:  
[The] white defendant in this case shows that anyone’s dignity can be violated [by the 
police]. But it is no secret that people of color are disproportionate victims of [heightened 
police] scrutiny. For generations, black and brown parents have given their children 
‘”he talk”—instructing them never to run down the street; always keep your hands 
where they can be seen; do not even think of talking back to a stranger—all out of fear 
of how an officer with a gun will react to them. By legitimizing the conduct that 
produces this double consciousness, this case tells everyone, white and black, guilty and 
innocent, that an officer can verify your legal status at any time. It says that your body 
is subject to invasion while courts excuse the violation of your rights. It implies that 
you are not a citizen of a democracy but the subject of a carceral state, just waiting to 
be cataloged. We must not pretend that the countless people who are routinely targeted 
by police are “isolated.” They are the canaries in the coal mine whose deaths, civil and 
literal, warn us that no one can breathe in this atmosphere. They are the ones who 
recognize that unlawful police stops corrode all our civil liberties and threaten all our 
lives. Until their voices matter too, our justice system will continue to be anything but. 
136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070–71 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
82  The Court has declared that it “is confronted with the task of reconciling conflicting rights of the 
diverse communities within our society and of individuals.” Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 
184, 200–01 (1964). In Boddie v. Connecticut, the Court reasoned: 
Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is more fundamental 
than its erection and enforcement of a system of rules defining the various rights and 
duties of its members, enabling them to govern their affairs and definitively settle their 
differences in an orderly, predictable manner. Without such a “legal system,” social 
organization and cohesion are virtually impossible; with the ability to seek regularized 
resolution of conflicts individuals are capable of interdependent action that enables 
them to strive for achievements without the anxieties that would beset them in a 
disorganized society. Put more succinctly, it is this injection of the rule of law that 
allows society to reap the benefits of rejecting what political theorists call the “state of 
nature.” American society, of course, bottoms its systematic definition of individual 
rights and duties, as well as its machinery for dispute settlement, not on custom or the 
will of strategically placed individuals, but on the common-law model. It is to courts, or 
other quasi-judicial official bodies, that we ultimately look for the implementation of a 
regularized, orderly process of dispute settlement. Within this framework, those who 
wrote our original Constitution, in the Fifth Amendment, and later those who drafted 
the Fourteenth Amendment recognized the centrality of the concept of due process in 
the operation of this system. Without this guarantee that one may not be deprived of 
his rights, neither liberty nor property, without due process of law, the State's monopoly 
over techniques for binding conflict resolution could hardly be said to be acceptable 
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Language can be rendered strictly binary depending on how one 
interprets and defines an overarching political community. Identity is subject 
to being restricted in political and legal discourse, while also retaining an 
expansive character or potential in the realm of socio-cultural discourse, 
depending on one’s characterization of what constitutes an American political 
community in representative policy spaces.83 A rigid binary framework of 
inclusion and exclusion based on universal criteria posited by elites at the 
helm of identity-based factions can generate rigid opposition to policy 
postures. Differing iterations of identity thereby proliferate in the public 
sphere of discourse and representational politics. 
 
III. PAST & PRESENT: THE ENDURING PROBLEM OF IDENTITY-BASED 
REPRESENTATION 
 
A politicized identity-framework informed the framing and subsequent 
interpretation of the Constitution from the founding onward. As noted by the 
Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, for instance, African Blacks were signaled out for 
less-than-legal personhood in the establishment of an American political 
community embodied in the founding Constitutional order:                                                          
under our scheme of things. Only by providing that the social enforcement mechanism 
must function strictly within these bounds can we hope to maintain an ordered society 
that is also just.  
401 U.S. 371, 374–75 (1971). 
83  John Stuart Mill prefigured this issue: 
A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality if they are united among 
themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any others—
which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people, 
desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by 
themselves or a portion of themselves exclusively. This feeling of nationality may have 
been generated by various causes. Sometimes it is the effect of identity of race and 
descent. Community of language, and community of religion, greatly contribute to it. 
Geographical limits are one of its causes. But the strongest of all is identity of political 
antecedents; the possession of a national history, and consequent community of 
recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the 
same incidents in the past. None of these circumstances, however, are either 
indispensable, or necessarily sufficient by themselves.  
JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 308 (Henry Holt 1873) 
(1861). 
To render a federation advisable, several conditions are necessary. The first is, that 
there should be a sufficient amount of mutual sympathy among the populations. The 
federation binds them always to fight on the same side; and if they have such feelings 
towards one another, or such diversity of feeling towards their neighbours [sic], that 
they would generally prefer to fight on opposite sides, the federal tie is neither likely to 
be of long duration, not to be well observed while it subsists. The sympathies available 
for the purpose are those of race, language, religion, and, above all, of political 
institutions, as conducing most to a feeling of identity of political interest. 
Id. at 320; see also Lyle Denniston, The Past and Future of America’s Political Community, NAT’L 
CONST. CTR.: CONST. DAILY (July 25, 2019), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/the-past-and-future-
of-americas-political-community.  
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The object of the [Fourteenth] amendment was undoubtedly to 
enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, 
but in the nature of things it could not have been intended to 
abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as 
distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the 
two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.84  
Critics of the Constitution at the founding, such as Patrick Henry and 
George Mason, contended that a truly representative republic could not 
function properly on the scale envisioned by the Constitution. Indeed, the 
multi-hued diversity of people, interests, and values of the population were 
simply too complex to capture in the identarian representational schema 
proffered by the Constitution.85   
Although renowned twentieth-century “sociologists such as Robert 
Park and Talcott Parsons predicted evolutionary progress in ethnic relations 
toward assimilation or inclusion of various groups within American society, 
nothing [in the present] indicates that such developments are at hand.”86 The 
issue of scale, which has burgeoned in a manner that could not have been 
envisioned by the founding generation, in conjunction with the notion that 
the sundry interests attached to identities “don’t stand still[,] . . . [t]hey 
evolve,”87 arguably remains a salient problem for the operation of a genuine 
representational democratic political system. At the time of the founding, 
George Mason thought that in the “House of Representatives sixty-five men 
would presume to reflect the interests of all the diverse states . . . . Mason 
reasoned, ‘there is not the Substance, but the Shadow of Representation.’”88 
Mason’s critique of the Constitution suffering from representational 
deficiency in the fundamental law has been transpiring for over two centuries 
as far as clarifying how political identities are expressed and perpetuated in 
the fundamental law and ordering of the polity.89 This deficiency, in part, can                                                         
84  163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896). 
85  See, e.g., LORRI GLOVER, THE FATE OF THE REVOLUTION: VIRGINIANS DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION 16–17 
(2016).  
86  Christopher E. Smith, The Supreme Court and Ethnicity, 69 OR. L. REV. 797, 812 (1990). 
87  KRAUTHAMMER, supra note 30, at 170. 
88  GLOVER, supra note 85, at 25. 
89  See generally CHARLES BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (1918) 
(contending that the structure of the U.S. Constitution was motivated primarily by the personal 
financial interests of the Founders, a cohesive economic elite sector that sought to protect the elite 
minority from the mass majority regarding private property and wealth); see also Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding that the fundamental right to marry is guaranteed to same-
sex couples by both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (finding 
that a state denies black defendants equal protection when members of his/her race have been 
purposefully excluded from a jury); Regents of the Univ. of. Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) 
(holding that a public university may take race into account as a factor in admissions decisions); 
Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (finding that a city school system’s failure to provide English 
language instruction to students of Chinese ancestry was unlawful discrimination); Jones v. Alfred 
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be traced to an underlying tensions and emergent contradictions that 
undergird the articulation and expression of the relationship between the 
individual and the group vis-à-vis politicized identarian classifications.90  
Race,91 ethnicity,92 voting,93 political and ideological affiliation,94 and 
sexuality95 constitute some of the legal and political fronts on which 
contestation over formal political identities and the proper ordering of society 
and community has been waged. At the founding, for instance, although not 
formally expressed as such, the political identity that was instrumental in 
“Constitution making was under the exclusive purview of property-owning 
white men because suffrage was strictly limited.”96 Madison, along with 
others during the founding, viewed the Constitutional order as an 
“enlightened natural aristocracy” that would effectively check and balance 
the People to avoid what was deemed “bad politics,” such as equal division of 
property.97 The People, the American political community, would thus be 
subject to multiple layers of controls that would effectively divest the energy 
that mobilized people to support “improper” policy initiatives, rendering the 
People passive recipients of enlightened rule. In Madison’s initial view of 
democracy, representation was to be considerably tempered in order to divest 
of force the People’s passions, desires, and interests so as to make the 
                                                        
H. Mayer Co. 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (holding that federal law bars all racial discrimination (private 
or public) in the sale or rental of property); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that state 
laws prohibiting inter-racial marriage are unconstitutional); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 
(1962) (prohibiting racial segregation of interstate and intrastate transportation facilities); Brown 
v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (prohibiting racial segregation of public 
schools).   
90  See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, NOT ONLY FOR MYSELF: IDENTITY, POLITICS, AND THE LAW, 40–1 (1997) 
(“[C]onflicts among self-identification, internal group membership practices, and external, 
oppressive assignments have given rise to . . . inconsistent meanings of group membership.”).  
91  See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (finding that the categorical exclusion of blacks 
from juries for no other reason than their race violated the Equal Protection Clause).  
92  See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (finding that exclusion of otherwise eligible persons 
from jury service solely because of their ancestry or national origin is violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
93  See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (finding that the Equal Protection Clause requires 
substantially equal legislative representation for all citizens in a State regardless of where they 
reside). 
94  See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (finding that the State cannot deprive people of the 
right of free association, even in the interests of national security). 
95  See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding a state law criminalizing sodomy), 
overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a state sodomy law, rendering 
same-sex sexual activity constitutionally protected).  
96  GLOVER, supra note 85, at 27. 
97  Id. at 25–30; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison); Adam M. 
Carrington, ‘Natural Aristocracy’ and the U.S. Constitution, NAT’L REV. (Oct. 27, 2017), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/10/united-states-constiuttion-declaration-independence-
founders-framers-natural-aristocracy-democracy-republicanism/.  
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populace amenable to a stable and orderly politics.98 Politicized identity 
proved a viable and significant means by which to enforce the “enlightened 
natural aristocracy.” 
A complicating factor in articulating representation and its evolution 
through space and time is that of politicized identity. The Founders shared 
and perpetuated their distinctive identities—political, ideological, and socio-
economic identity-based factions—by embedding said identities into the 
fundamental law, the Constitutional text and ethos that undergird any 
permutations or iterations of an American political community. The racial 
and class-based nature of the Founders’ overall identities and experience 
informed the politicized identity which found, and continues to find, 
expression in the Constitutional framework. The Constitutional order, as 
initially conceived and into the present, is one that was and that continues to 
be interpreted from a politicized identity perspective. During the founding, it 
was between federalists and confederationist factions, for instance, and in the 
present, we find that representation, broadly conceived, remains the province 
of an elite (which the confederationists feared) that define the contours and 
parameters of what constitutes representation in the legal and political 
process governed by the fundamental law embodied in the Constitution. 
Elites in the political and legal process continue to deploy identity to 
perpetuate particular, suitable interpretations of identity in public 
discourse.99 
In the case of law, we can view the foregoing in the Court’s 
jurisprudence when it comes to gerrymandering, voting, civil rights, housing, 
and other realms of ordering society that are affected by how the Court 
interprets representation. This is especially the case when seeking to locate 
the source and scope of State power under the Constitution. Early in its 
history, the Court privileged a nationalist interpretation of the Constitution 
over a local/regional state-based approach to representation. In McCulloch v. 
Maryland,100 the Court declared that “government proceeds directly from the 
people; is ‘ordained and established,’ in the name of the people; and is 
declared to be ordained, ‘in order to form a more perfect union, establish 
justice, insure domestic tranquility, and secure the blessings of liberty to 
themselves and to their posterity.’” The Court embedded its political, 
normative, ideological, and socio-economic worldview—based on the 
politicized identity of Chief Justice Marshall—who viewed federal power as                                                         
98  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); Jeffrey Rosen, America Is Living James Madison’s 
Nightmare, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/10/james-
madison-mob-rule/568351/. 
99  See, e.g., Sanjana Karanth & Nick Visser, Joe Biden Refuses to Apologize for Comments on 
Segregationists, HUFFINGTON POST (June 19, 2019, 9:29 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/joe-
biden-refuse-apologize-segregationist_n_5d0adccfe4b09f5a54b5e266. 
100  17 U.S. 316, 403–04 (1819). 
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emanating from “We the People” not “We the States.”101 In Chisholm v. 
Georgia, the Court asserted: 
To the Constitution of the United States the term Sovereign, is 
totally unknown. There is but one place where it could have 
been used with propriety. But, even in that place it would not 
have comported with the delicacy of those, who ordained and 
established that Constitution. They might have announced 
themselves ‘Sovereign people’ of the United States: But 
serenely conscious of that fact, they avoided the ostentatious 
declaration.102 
A fundamental problem considered immanent in the Constitutional 
order set forth at the founding was that “as vast a territory as the United 
States could never be governed as a single republic.”103 Identity-based 
factions are in the sociocultural and political DNA of American politics, law, 
and society. Indeed, identity-based factions—Federalist/Anti-federalist, 
Property Holder/Non-Property Holder, Federal/State, and North/South—were 
key players in defining, implementing, and interpreting the Constitution. 
Formal political identity, expressed in the guise of regional interests and 
identities, would be a weighty factor in the dissolution of the Union.104 
During ratification, Judge Harry Innes asserted: “Our interests [as Southern 
States] and the interests of the Eastern States are so diametrically opposite 
to each other that there cannot be ray of hope left to the Western Country to 
suppose that when once that interest clashes we shall have justice done 
us.”105  
                                                        
101  Louise Weinberg, Of Sovereignty and the Union: The Legends of Alden, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1113, 1150 (2001); see also Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Fourteenth Amendment's Constitution, 69 
S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 66 (1995) (“Marshall treated the American people as a single entity incapable of 
making a binding agreement with itself.”). 
102  2 U.S. 419, 454 (1793); see also Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 324 (1816) (“The 
constitution of the United States was ordained and established, not by the states in their sovereign 
capacities, but emphatically, as the preamble of the constitution declares, by ‘the people of the 
United States.’”). 
103  GLOVER, supra note 85, at 28.  
104  See Lori Robinson, Region and Race: National Identity and the Southern Past, in A COMPANION TO 
THE REGIONAL LITERATURES OF AMERICA 57 (Charles L. Crow ed., 2003); Anthony Daniel Perez & 
Charles Hirschman, The Changing Racial and Ethnic Composition of the US Population: Emerging 
American Identities, 35 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 1 (2009). 
105  Harry Innes to John Brown (Feb. 20, 1788), in 16 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION 
OF THE CONSTITUTION: COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, VOLUME 4, 1 
FEBRUARY TO 31 MARCH 1788, at 152, 152–53 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1986). 
Innes himself was a fascinating figure for the purposes of considering politicized identity. A 
staunch supporter of Kentucky’s independence from Virginia and an Anti-Federalist opponent of 
ratification, he was also a close ally of George Washington and served as a federal judge from the 
founding until his death in 1816. – Ed. See generally MARY K. BONSTEEL TACHAU, FEDERAL COURTS 
IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: KENTUCKY, 1789–1816, at 31–53 (1978). 
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The complexity and problems of identity being interspersed in the 
formative period of the Constitutional order is also reflected in the power 
binary between state and national governments. For instance, in opposition 
to the federalists during the Virginia Constitutional debates, Patrick Henry 
declared: “‘What right had they to say, We, the People[,] . . . States are the 
Characteristics, and the soul of a confederation.’ The framers, Henry 
believed, had destroyed the sovereign states and created ‘one great 
consolidated National Government.’”106 Furthermore, George Mason “insisted 
that sixty-five representatives ‘cannot possibly know the situation and 
circumstances of all the inhabitants of this immense continent. It would . . . 
be impossible to have a full and adequate representation in the General 
Government; it would be too . . . unwieldy.’”107 For Mason, locally-based 
representation, group, and ideological identity should have controlled, not a 
unitary and politicized notion of “We the People.” During the Virginia 
constitutional debates, he reflected on “traditional, localistic ideas about 
representation. Representatives . . .‘ought to mix with the People, think as 
they think, feel as they feel, ought to be perfectly amenable to them, and 
thoroughly acquainted with their interest and condition.’”108 
In light of the foregoing contextualization of the impact that politicized 
identity has had since the founding, it is important, when attempting to map 
out the contemporary terrain of politics, to grasp the relationship between 
representation and identity-based factions. This enables a critical awareness 
of the effects political identity has on politics when it is the principal form of 
organizing political platforms and articulating public policy. Representation 
remains a key ordering concept that continues to transect the political and 
legal process, constitutional order, and the legal actuality that emanates from 
the Court’s interpretation of representation and notions of an American 
political community. In the context of legislative apportionment, for instance, 
which directly impacts the form and substance of representation, the Court 
has noted that “fair and effective representation for all citizens” is a basic 
component of—and helps ensure the operation of—a genuinely 
representational political system.109 In light of recent social-scientific 
research on group psychology, some commentators contend that, in light of 
representational politics, “heterogeneous groups make better collective 
judgments than homogenous groups.”110  
 Politicized identity, as expressed in policy, politics, and law, is a 
discursive construct that is endowed with plasticity due to its cultural,                                                         
106  GLOVER, supra note 85, at 105. 
107  Id. at 107. 
108  Id.  
109  Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964). 
110  Carla D. Pratt, Judging Identity, 2016 REVISTA FORUMUL JUDECĂTORILOR 84, 86 (2016) (citing 
Katherine W. Phillips, Katie A. Liljenquist & Margaret A. Neale, Is the Pain Worth the Gain? The 
Advantages and Liabilities of Agreeing with Socially Distinct Newcomers, 35 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 336, 345–47 (2009)). 
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ideological, and political nature. Identity discourse provides, or rather 
attempts to provide, some form of bright-line boundaries for advocacy and 
inclusion/exclusion. This dynamic directly impacts the limits of “correct” 
thought and conduct and the proper conception and articulation of interests 
and goals in the realm of public policy. In the case of those politicians seeking 
the Democratic nomination to run against President Trump in 2020, 
politicized identity is at the forefront of who is encouraged, predicted, 
allowed, or favored to secure the nomination.111 The foregoing is an example 
of how, within a discourse of politicized identity, one is subject to a 
“relationship of power, of domination, of varying degrees of complex 
hegemony.”112  
 Identity-based factions produce a discourse that helps constitute the 
parameters and contours of politics. This produces a base of critique and 
knowledge that centers around select limited concepts, and systemically and 
systematically perpetuates the discourse of “correctness” that emanates from 
the exercise of power to posit a politicized identity.  This is important to note 
because concepts can be analogized to analytic nets placed over the cognitive 
and perceptive frameworks employed by a subject to navigate politics and 
society. That is,  
different nets correspond to different systems for describing the 
world.  Mechanics determines one form of description of the 
world by saying that all propositions used in the description of 
the world must be obtained in a given way from a given set of 
propositions—the axioms of mechanics.  It thus supplies the 
bricks for building the edifice of [knowledge], and it says, “Any 
building that you want to erect, whatever it may be, must 
somehow be constructed with these bricks, and these alone.”113 
 
IV. LAW, POLITICS, IDENTITY & REPRESENTATION  
 
Law is the means by which policy is effectuated. The law is part of a 
biopolitics in which power is exercised in a manner that can be characterized 
as the “power of regulation” to regularize life, which “consists in making live .                                                         
111  See Rich Barlow, Democrats Shouldn’t Rule Out Candidates Because of Race or Gender — That 
Includes White Men, WBUR COGNOSCENTI (Jan. 10, 2019), 
https://www.wbur.org/cognoscenti/2019/01/10/democratic-presidential-nominee-2020-rich-barlow 
(“[O]bsessing over identity rather than the content of character both ignores Martin Luther King, 
Jr.’s counsel and flirts with political fire.”); see also Jamelle Bouie, Democrats Have Made One 
Thing Very Clear About 2020: They’re Over White Men: Or, Why Kamala Harris Looks Like a Likely 
Nominee, SLATE (Nov. 15, 2018), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/11/democratic-
presidential-candidates-2020-diversity-white-men.html. 
112  SAID, supra note 70, at 1787. 
113  LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS 68 (D. F. Pears & B.F. McGuinness 
trans., Routledge 1975). 
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. . the right to intervene to make live . . . [and] eliminating . . . deficiencies.”114 
The “regularization of life,” as Michel Foucault terms it, in the context of 
biopower and politics, is one that excludes, reduces, and emplaces thought 
and being in binary oppositions within which complexity, diversity, and the 
morass of human beings are simplified in the name of a pragmatic politics, 
which in turn, serves a narrowly defined identity for the purposes of wielding 
power in politics and policy.115 Complex notions of representation are 
attenuated.116 Politicized identity is thus part of the “biosocial or biological 
processes characteristic of human masses.”117  
When considering the law’s rule-based mandate to procure order, it is 
interesting to note how law seeks to regularize life and administer identity as 
articulated by elites in the service of effectuating policy agendas, which are 
notions of an American political community. Fixing identity in space and 
time for the explicit purpose of political mobilization, organization, and as the 
conceptual basis for applied representation and public policy, may suffer from 
what Chief Justice Roger Traynor observed in Pacific Gas & Electric v. G.W. 
Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co.,118 where he addressed the difficulty in 
assigning a singular meaning to a particular word; an observation readily 
applied to the inherent problem in attempting to fix identity designations:  
If words had absolute and constant references, it might be 
possible to discover . . . intention in the words themselves and 
in the manner in which they were arranged. Words, however,                                                         
114  Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, in NORTON ANTHOLOGY, supra note 1, at 1445. In terms 
of identity and the law, the Court has found that identity is key in various areas of societal affairs 
and requires special attention in some form or other. For example, in United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, a unanimous Court found that it was a violation of the Fourth Amendment for a roving 
patrol car to stop a vehicle solely on the basis of the driver appearing to be of Mexican descent. 422 
U.S. 873 (1975). 
115  See MICHEL FOUCAULT, “SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED”: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE, 1975–
1976, at 247–49 (Mauro Bertani & Alessandro Fontana eds., David Macey trans., 2003). 
116  In the instant case, the impact of the Massachusetts statute on women is undisputed. 
Any veteran with a passing grade on the civil service exam must be placed ahead of a 
nonveteran, regardless of their respective scores. The District Court found that, as a 
practical matter, this preference supplants test results as the determinant of upper 
level civil service appointments. Because less than 2% of the women in Massachusetts 
are veterans, the absolute-preference formula has rendered desirable state civil service 
employment an almost exclusively male prerogative. As the District Court recognized, 
this consequence follows foreseeably, indeed inexorably, from the long history of policies 
severely limiting women’s participation in the military. Although neutral in form, the 
statute is anything but neutral in application. It inescapably reserves a major sector of 
public employment to “an already established class which, as a matter of historical fact, 
is 98% male.” Where the foreseeable impact of a facially neutral policy is so 
disproportionate, the burden should rest on the State to establish that sex-based 
considerations played no part in the choice of the particular legislative scheme. 
See, e.g., Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 283–84 (1979). 
117  Foucault, supra note 114, at 1447. 
118  442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968). 
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do not have absolute and constant referents. . . . The meaning 
of particular words or groups of words varies with the . . . verbal 
context and surrounding circumstances and purposes in view of 
the linguistic education and experience of their users and their 
hearers or readers (not excluding judges). . . . A word has no 
meaning apart from these factors; much less does it have an 
objective meaning, one true meaning.119  
Judge O. Rogeriee Thompson’s dissent in Kosilek v. Spencer120 
illuminates Justice Traynor’s observation of the problem in capturing and 
perpetuating identity. Judge Thompson notes that the majority opinion 
reifies the gender binary of male/female to deny benefits to a transgender 
inmate, and that it “aggrieves an already marginalized community, and 
enables correctional systems to further postpone their adjustment to the 
crumbling gender binary.”121 This identity-based binary is the basis of law, 
which informs and organizes 
our daily interactions, our values, our social institutions . . . our 
very understanding of reality, around these assumptions. One 
is not fully cognizable as human without a designation as male 
or female. The categories of sex and gender and the differences 
we ascribe to them are legitimized through naturalizing them, 
insisting that they are based on real, inevitable differences and 
thus go unquestioned . . . this binary system[, however,] is not 
natural, but socially and politically constructed.122  
 It is important to note that, irrespective of where one is situated on 
the formal ideological spectrum, attempting to suspend identity-based 
classifications in space and time seems to have the effect of emplacing 
subjects in essentialized identity templates that ossify, perpetuate stasis, and 
are not able to transcend the historical moment in which said identity-based 
classifications were articulated and implemented in the legal and political 
process and policy spaces.  
Politicized identity, while imbricated in policy, generally speaking, has 
distinct impacts on policy when it is employed to mobilize, organize, define, 
and posit distinctive identity groups’ interests on the political stage. 
Politicized identity leaves an imprimatur on policy because:  
Policy making functions on several different planes as it reflects 
values, goals, interests, politics, history, and culture. At the                                                         
119  Id. at 644–45 (quoting Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 
50 CORNELL L.Q. 161, 187 (1965)). 
120  Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 96 (1st Cir. 2014) (Rogeriee Thompson, J., dissenting). 
121  Id. at 113 (Rogeriee Thompson, J., dissenting). 
122  Tara Dunnavant, Note, Bye-Bye Binary: Transgender Prisoners and the Regulation of Gender in the 
Law, 9 FED. CTS. L. REV. 15, 20 (2016). 
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same time . . . policy reflects the purpose and meaning of being 
a member of a political unit and forming a political identity. As 
such, public policy is not “the rules of governance for our 
society” but [rather it is] the ambience within which those rules 
are to be made.123  
Politicized identity thus has a very broad impact on law, politics, and policy 
beyond the sociopolitical and ideological agendas of identity-based factions 
and the individual subjects that perpetuate and reside within formal 
identarian classifications.  
Law is a producer and product of knowledge. Legal process and 
discourse inform the administration of justice and ostensibly safeguard 
American norms and values, such as the rule of law, separation of powers, 
checks and balances, and due process—each of which has weighty 
implications for the actuality of subjects that reside within the law’s 
jurisdiction. “Policymaking embodies identity formation while it preserves, 
enhances, or augments the power to classify and define legal and political 
actuality. As the structural ambience that anchors the constitutional order, 
policy making also dismantles identity as it re-configures social functions and 
redefines social welfare.”124  
Law is fraught with complexity and contradictions. Attempts to 
integrate formal politicized identity into law can create additional problems 
for representative politics because of politicized identity’s capacity to cabin 
the scope or circumference of representation.125 From a universalist lens, the 
reductivist nature of politicized identity, which has the effect of seriously 
simplifying the diverse and complex intersectionality of competing identities 
to a singular, palpable identity for public and political consumption, shrinks 
                                                        
123  Marvin L. Astrada, The Nature of the Judicial Process: A Complex Systems Analysis of Checks & 
Balances & Separation of Powers in the Present Political Context, 21 RICH. PUB. INT. L. REV. 263, 
278 (2017), https://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol21/iss3/4. For a discussion on how politics 
affects and effects law and policy, see Bradley W. Joondeph, The Many Meanings of "Politics" in 
Judicial Decision Making, 77 UMKC L. REV. 347, 348 (2008), 
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/35 (“[P]olitics is generally understood as the fight over 
whose views and values should prevail in the allocation of scarce societal resources, the struggle 
over who receives various social benefits and who bears the costs.”). 
124  Astrada, supra note 123, at 279; see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 
(2010) (holding political campaign contributions by corporations and labor unions constitute speech 
protected by the Constitution); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding unconstitutional laws 
that restrict a woman’s right to an abortion prior to fetal viability); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436 (1966) (holding police must advise criminal suspects of their rights under the Constitution to 
remain silent, consult an attorney, and have legal representation appointed if indigent); Brown v. 
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding segregating schools by race violates the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (holding that 
trying a defendant particular race or ethnicity in front of a jury where all persons of his race or 
ethnicity have been excluded by the state violates of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding courts may not enforce restrictive 
racial covenants for real estate). 
125  See MARK LILLA, THE ONCE AND FUTURE LIBERAL: AFTER IDENTITY POLITICS 71–72 (2017). 
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the space of representation vis-à-vis the public sphere in which policy is 
articulated and implemented. As Madison notes: 
[L]aws, though penned with the greatest technical skill, and 
passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are 
considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their 
meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular 
discussions and adjudications. Besides the obscurity arising 
from the complexity of objects, and the imperfection of the 
human faculties, the medium through which the conceptions of 
men are conveyed to each other adds a fresh embarrassment. 
The use of words is to express ideas. Perspicuity, therefore, 
requires not only that the ideas should be distinctly formed, but 
that they should be expressed by words distinctly and 
exclusively appropriate to them. But no language is so copious 
as to supply words and phrases for every complex idea, or so 
correct as not to include many equivocally denoting different 
ideas. Hence it must happen that however accurately objects 
may be discriminated in themselves, and however accurately 
the discrimination may be considered, the definition of them 
may be rendered inaccurate by the inaccuracy of the terms in 
which it is delivered.126  
A pluralistic sub-community view of an American political community 
finds strength in heterogeneity and expansive notions of national community. 
A more restrictive universalist perspective, on the other hand, views law’s 
relationship to fair and effective representation as being complicated by 
politicized identity when it is the primary mechanism for effectuating policy. 
This is the case because the latter comprehends society as constituted by “so 
many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination 
of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable . . . society 
itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens.”127 
The “political thicket”128 of politicized identity has the potential to exacerbate 
the erosion of the overarching political system’s representative capacity. As a 
form of knowledge and practice, law is subject to the same limitations as 
social-scientific knowledge: “knowledge falls into a complex, conflict-filled 
social environment, inhabited by agents with different interests and 
motivations . . . ‘sheer knowledge alone, or “disinterested search for truth,” 
                                                        
126  THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison). 
127  THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison). 
128  OXFORD UNIV. PRESS, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 317 
(Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005). See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (The Court should abstain “from political entanglements and by 
abstention from injecting itself into the clash of political forces in political settlements.”).  
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will never be determinative.’”129 Due to the “open-textured nature of law,”130 
identity politics and politicized identity—when viewed as either constituting 
a homogenous American political community or one constituted by sub-sets of 
identity-based communities—can have a substantial impact on contouring 
the representative space of groups or subjects.131    
The Court has expressed various opinions about the relationship 
between politicized identity and representation and has articulated sundry 
legal tests and principles in developing its interpretation of representation, 
and by default, the character and content of the American political 
community.132 This is significant for any analysis of politicized identity 
because of the implications Court decisions have for defining the character 
and content of an American political community.133 In Shaw v. Reno, for 
instance, the Court noted, regarding challenges to a redistricting plan: 
[B]y perpetuating stereotypical notions about members of the 
same racial group—that they think alike, share the same 
political interests, and prefer the same candidates—a racial 
gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc 
voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to 
counteract. It also sends to elected representatives the message 
that their primary obligation is to represent only that group’s 
members rather than their constituency as a whole.134  
                                                        
129  SCHNEIDER, supra note 29, at 211. 
130  Joondeph, supra note 123, at 358. 
131  See, e.g., Parents Involved v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (“[T]he way ‘to 
achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis’ is to stop 
assigning students on a racial basis. The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race.”).  
132  Consider that the “Supreme Court has (especially when invoking the fourteenth amendment) 
advanced such causes as a constitutionalized right to abortion on demand, a constitutionalized 
leniency toward pornography, constitutionalized racial quotas, constitutionalized judicial 
supervision of state school curricula, and a constitutionalized proscription of voluntary, 
nondenominational public school prayer.” George Steven Swan, The Political Economy of Supreme 
Court Social Policymaking 1987, 8 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 87, 88 (1989).  
133 [Judicial] decisions throughout American history have generally reflected the nation's 
prevailing social and political mores. The Supreme Court held that racial segregation 
comported with the Fourteenth Amendment in 1896, but that it was unconstitutional 
in 1954. It held that states could criminalize sodomy between consenting adults in 1986, 
but that such laws were impermissible in 2003. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 
(1896); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 
(1954); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). On neither issue had the relevant 
sources of legal authority changed. But on both issues, societal attitudes had evolved 
significantly, growing less tolerant of racial segregation and more tolerant of 
homosexuality.  
Joondeph, supra note 123, at 365–66. 
134  Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 631 (1993). 
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The Court has found that politicized identity is most viable when an 
identity-based group is found to be “politically cohesive.”135 From a 
universalist lens of political community, identity-based factional elites and 
entrepreneurs may thus be incentivized to “find” or manufacture consent, so 
to speak, as to what constitutes a discrete and insular cohesive identity that 
will, in turn, find expression and protection under the law that may be at 
odds with the actualities that undergird a political community. Cohesiveness, 
however, must appear organic or at the very least not “forced.” When probing 
the relationship between politicized identity and law, the Court, in Bush v. 
Vera, for example, stated that legislative decisions that focus primarily on 
race in redistricting “cause constitutional harm insofar as they convey the 
message that political identity is, or should be, predominantly racial.”136 Yet, 
from a pluralistic sub-communities perspective, an identity-based faction is 
part and parcel constitutive of an American community, as sub-communities 
are facets, components of a mosaic rather than a universal template 
underpinning an American political community.  
Due to the potential for putting forth a politicized identity that may be 
artificially cohesive, politicized identity may further complicate an already 
knotty state of affairs in the realm of law and representation. Within the 
context of law and public policy, politics has been described as constituting 
the following characteristics: “(1) politics accommodates competing interests; 
(2) politics is empirical; (3) politics is inspired by an underlying moral 
foundation; and (4) politics is an ongoing conversation.”137 Each of these 
components or dimensions of politics can be employed to describe 
representational politics. “The accommodation of interests and principles 
emerges from an ongoing conversation. Accommodations never are final or 
complete. They may receive all of the attention and study, but it is the 
accommodating—the ongoing conversation—that does all of the work.”138 
Based on one’s perspective of what is or what should constitute American 
political community and representative political spaces, politicized identity 
may prima facie negatively impact characteristics one and four and may do 
little to buttress or enhance three.   
In the case of representational politics, accommodation seems to be a 
core norm-ordering principle: “The business of politics is not with theory and 
ideology but with accommodation.”139 Identity-based factions can be viewed 
as espousing, in essence, a monopoly over the definition, goals, interests, and 
articulation of identity, politicizing it in order to promulgate a particular 
interpretation of a group’s goals and interests in policy spaces. This dynamic, 
to some degree, cuts against the foundational value and norm of                                                         
135  See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986). 
136  517 U.S. 952, 980 (1996). 
137  Moeller, supra note 77, at 204. 
138  Id. at 207. 
139  ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 19 (1975). 
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accommodation. For those that espouse a “correct” or singular interpretation 
of an identity’s form and substance, the problem becomes that claims to 
positing an identity in policy spaces can render an identity rigid or static:  
[N]o group or interest can legitimately claim an absolute right 
to any position. Not only are absolute claims fraught with 
dangerous consequences . . . but absolute rights do not exist. 
Rights are real only when and because society grants them. 
Thus, one can argue persuasively that society should grant the 
right to vote or the right to decent health care, but they become 
rights only when the society’s accommodation affirms them as 
rights.140  
Whether one subscribes to or employs a universalist or the more 
nuanced pluralistic sub-communities framework in the political and legal 
process, a political faction—homogenous in nature or comprised of 
heterogenous components and subcomponents—was originally acknowledged 
as attenuating the representative capacity of a democratic political system in 
The Federalist.141 In the case of identity-based factions employing politicized 
identity in policy spaces, a modern interpretation of faction—one that is 
united, actuated by a common impulse, passion or interest—can have a 
potentially negative impact on representational politics. This is the case 
because: (1) the elite that articulate the identity may not in actuality 
represent the interests of group members and sub groups in the community; 
or (2) the interest being proffered by elites that “speak” for the group may 
reflect the priorities of the elite rather than that of the groups and 
individuals that are being spoken for in policy spaces. A formal identity 
faction may thus be less representative of a group’s actualities and interests, 
occluding alternative interpretations of what constitutes an identity and its 
representation in policy. 
Policy is the expression of correct modalities that order and represent a 
political community. “Every community has an ethical environment, and that 
environment makes a difference to the lives its members can lead.”142 The 
essence of a political community’s identity, distinct from the individuals or 
groups and subgroups that constitute and reside within a polity, is embodied 
in national policy spaces, for example, judicial opinions, which are products 
and producers of the legal and political process that underpin a polity.143 The 
Court has faced some of the problems that emerge from this state of affairs:  
At the heart of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection 
lies the simple command that the Government must treat                                                         
140  Moeller, supra note 77, at 204–05. 
141  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
142  Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 479, 480 (1989). 
143  See Stephen M. Feldman, The Supreme Court in a Postmodern World: A Flying Elephant, 84 MINN. 
L. REV. 673 (2000).  
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citizens “as individuals, not ‘as simply components of a racial, 
religious, sexual or national class.’” Social scientists may debate 
how people’s thoughts and behavior reflect their background, 
but the Constitution provides that the Government may not 
allocate benefits and burdens among individuals based on the 
assumption that race or ethnicity determines how they act or 
think.144  
How individuals “act or think” in policy spaces can be linked to particular 
identity-based factions.145 Constitutional law and theory as articulated by the 
Court reflects some of the effects that politicized identity has on politics, law, 
representation, and community. In the case of voting and race, the Court has 
stated that: 
When the State assigns voters on the basis of race, it engages 
in the offensive and demeaning assumption that voters of a 
particular race, because of their race, “think alike, share the 
same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at 
the polls.” Race-based assignments “embody stereotypes that 
treat individuals as the product of their race, evaluating their 
thoughts and efforts—their very worth as citizens—according 
to a criterion barred to the Government by history and the 
Constitution.” They also cause society serious harm. . . . Racial 
classifications with respect to voting carry particular dangers. 
Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may 
balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry 
us further from the goal of a political system in which race no 
longer matters—a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to 
aspire.146 
In Holder v. Hall,147 the Court found that when “there is no objective 
and workable standard for choosing a reasonable benchmark to evaluate a 
challenged voting practice, it cannot be challenged as dilutive under Section 
                                                        
144  Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Ariz. 
Governing Comm’n v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1083 (1983)), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); see also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991) (“Race cannot be a 
proxy for determining juror bias or competence.”); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) 
(“Classifying persons according to their race is more likely to reflect racial prejudice than 
legitimate public concerns; the race, not the person, dictates the category.”). 
145  Ortiz M. Walton, Toward a Non-Racial, Non-Ethnic Society, in MULTI-AMERICA, supra note 15, at 
452. (“[R]acial and ethnic classifications are more ideological than scientific and frequently utilized 
by politicians and demagogues for the purpose of divisiveness . . . are we yet at the point of just 
becoming human beings sans ethnicity and race?”). 
146  Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911–12 (1995) (citations omitted). 
147  512 U.S. 874 (1994). 
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II” of the Voting Rights Act.148 Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, 
criticized vote dilution theory for redistricting, characterizing it as “a slightly 
less precise mechanism than the racial register for allocating representation 
on the basis of race.”149 Justice Thomas found that vote dilution claims based 
on racial identity are underpinned by an assumption of actual or objective 
cohesiveness of a politicized identity group and that “political cohesiveness, 
as practically applied, has proved little different from a working assumption 
that racial groups can be conceived of largely as [distinct] political interest 
groups.”150 In Miller v. Johnson, however, Justice Ginsburg in her dissent 
noted that, “ethnicity itself can tie people together . . . even people with 
divergent economic interests. For this reason, ethnicity is a significant force 
in political life.”151  
 
V. NUANCES & PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH POLITICIZED IDENTITY 
 
The employment of politicized identity by identity-based factions in 
accruing power to shape public policy creates discursive conceptual loci that, 
for better or worse—depending on one’s political and ideological orientation 
vis-à-vis political community—directly impact the character and content of 
representation.152 Identity politics generally speaking—and identity-based 
factions specifically—have had the effect, to some degree, of reifying a 
fragmented, as opposed to collective, sense of public policy and general 
welfare.153 While it is indisputably important and necessary to capture the 
diversity of the populace in policy spaces, formal politicized identity as the                                                         
148  Id. at 881. 
149  Id. at 908 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
150  Id. at 905. 
151  Miller, 515 U.S. at 944 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
152  In analyzing arguments pertaining to the role of ethics in communitarian contexts, Ronald 
Dworkin notes the different iterations of community have serious consequences for how a political 
community is articulated in the political and legal process and in policy spaces:  
Each of these arguments uses the concept of community in an increasingly more 
substantial and less reductive way. The first argument, that a democratic majority has 
a right to define ethical standards for all, uses community only as a shorthand symbol 
for a particular, numerically defined, political grouping. The second argument, which 
encourages paternalism, gives the concept more substance: It defines community not as 
just a political group, but as the dimensions of a shared and distinct responsibility. The 
third argument, that people need community, recognizes community as an entity in its 
own right, as a source of a wide variety of influences and benefits not reducible to the 
contributions of particular people one by one. The fourth argument, about 
identification, further personifies community and describes a sense in which a political 
community is not only independent of, but prior to, individual citizens.  
Dworkin, supra note 142 at 480.   
153  Mukherjee, supra note 15, at 455–57. (“Language, race, religion, blood, myth, history, national 
codes, and manners have all been used . . . in the US . . . to enforce terror, to ‘otherize’ . . . . 
[Q]uestions such as who is an American and what is American culture are being posed with 
belligerence and being answered with violence.”). 
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singular means to do so in the overarching policy space may have the 
consequence of balkanizing politics and exacerbating existing fissures. 
Identity-based factions may have an adverse effect on the systemic national 
community in order to highlight and protect the interests of the system’s sub-
communities, the constitutive parts of the American polity. Alternatives to 
politicized identity can perhaps be found in a shared and “explicitly expressed 
[American] system of general ideas,”154 such as the Declaration of 
Independence, U.S. Constitution, legal categories such as citizenship, and 
procedural and substantive due process.  
Politicized identity has high degrees of efficiency when it comes to 
shaping the political and legal process and resultant public policy spaces 
that, in turn, reflect an American political community. This is the case, in 
part, because identity-based political factions are able to articulate interests 
based on objectively ascertainable criteria that purport to capture the essence 
of individual and group-based identity affiliation that goes to the core of what 
members may feel is the touchstone of their being.155 Meaning and purpose of 
a subject are conditioned by perceived membership in a group because it 
functions as a repository of one’s sense of self. A problematic aspect of 
politicized identity that lurks in the penumbras of representational politics is 
that identity-based factional elites and entrepreneurs may be “confounding 
conveniently abstracted features of human beings with [the] concrete totality 
of these beings.”156 The politicized subject of an identity-based faction is 
required to remain within the confines of a general panoramic context that 
adheres to pre-established rules of constitution. In light of the foregoing, it 
may be the case that: 
[C]laims made on behalf of canonical identities or members of 
canonical identity groups are just political claims, like claims 
made on behalf of labor unions or gun owners or oil companies: 
Gay marriage isn't necessarily weightier than the Family 
Medical Leave Act; Title VII is just another regulation of the 
market for labor, like the NLRA or ERISA.157  
This type of contention is, of course, subject to critique and debate. The 
perceptive lens one employs will directly affect how one assesses politicized 
identity.                                                             
154  BRUCE BAWER, THE VICTIM’S REVOLUTION: THE RISE OF IDENTITY STUDIES & THE CLOSING OF THE 
LIBERAL MIND xiii (2012). 
155  Politicized identity, and the identity-based factions that promulgate it, are reductivist in nature. 
Each does not reflect the complex actuality of an individual subject. This “reduction of human 
relations to ultra-tidy notions of group oppression results in an outrageously crude picture of the 
world . . . plenty of people are oppressed—or ignored, mocked, or looked down upon—for reasons 
other than race, class, gender, or sexual orientation.” Id. at 38. 
156  SCHNEIDER, supra note 29, at 212. 
157  Ford, supra note 2, at 53. 
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Politicized identity, as the basis for political organization and 
representation, has the potential of blurring the demarcation between 
identity as a personal experiential state of affairs and identity as an objective 
category that is deployed to create political- ideological platforms for the 
purpose of organizing and affecting public policy in the name of identarian 
policy claims. It “remains the case that neither language, nor religion, nor 
nationality, nor shared moral or political views, is a likely candidate for the 
communitarian symbol [of an American political community] that seems to be 
a part of all true communities.”158 A virtue of formal politicized identity, on 
the other hand, is that it helps create bonds of commonality among distinct 
subgroups in the polity that allow for a degree of representation at the 
macroscopic or national level. Marriage equality, for instance, can be viewed 
as an attempt to enable pluralistic sub-communities to participate in a 
universal institution.159 Yet, a pitfall seems to be that politicized identity is 
also reductivist in that it de-diversifies individual subjects and sub-groups 
within the larger umbrella group signifier. The power to name, to establish 
authoritative and “true” signifiers to indicate objective signifiers, is 
immanent in the power to identify, classify, and provide singular criteria for 
inclusion or exclusion.160 What are the consequences for representational 
politics as far as the larger political context that frames public policy? 
Politicized identity is an act of imagination: a self and group affiliation “are 
not primordial but historically produced[; in the case of race,] whiteness and 
blackness were historically created and [are] historically variable 
categories.”161 
The contradiction inherent in identity politics as the basis for 
representation is that politics and policy reflect a conception of the “world as 
a multi-chrome mosaic of monochrome identity groups.”162 A “social group 
should not be understood as an essence . . . with a specific set of common 
attributes. Instead, group identity should be understood in relational terms. . 
. . There is no common nature that members of a group have.”163 As a form of 
legal, political, and cultural discourse, politicized identity communicates and 
is packaged for public consumption based on its ability to perpetuate a 
                                                        
158  Frederick Schauer, Community, Citizenship, and the Search for National Identity, 84 MICH. L. REV. 
1504, 1515 (1986). 
159  See Gwendolyn M. Leachman, Institutionalizing Essentialism: Mechanisms of Intersectional 
Subordination Within the LGBT Movement, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 655 (2016). 
160  See MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS & OTHER WRITINGS 1972-1977, at 
131–32 (Colin Gordon ed., 1980). 
161  Brubaker & Cooper, supra note 36 at 29. 
162  Id. at 31. 
163  Iris Marion Young, Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship, 99 
ETHICS 250, 260 (1989). 
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political and ideological discourse that is rooted in sameness, which provides 
a means to exercise power via a hegemonic discourse.164  
[Politicized identity provides] a systematized standard of 
recognizability—of sameness—by which all others can be 
assessed, regulated and allotted to a designated social location 
. . . power formations not only function at the material level but 
are also expressed in systems of theoretical and cultural 
representation, political and normative narratives and social 
modes of identification. There are neither coherent, nor rational 
and their makeshift nature is instrumental to their hegemonic 
force.165  
 Identity-based factions are thus products and producers of power—the power 
to name, classify, designate, the gatekeepers who authoritatively define and 
represent a politicized identity in policy spaces.166  
Some critics have claimed that identity politics and the politics of 
identification have created a “pseudo-politics of self-regard and increasingly 
narrow and exclusionary self-definition.”167 An identity-based faction does 
exert a unique influence on representative politics and policy spaces in that 
politicized identity employs a “presumption of sameness, whether in the form 
of universal moral equality or shared identity, [which] obscures biases, 
nuances, and alternative visions.”168 Politicized “identity—in the 
contemporary sense of an inner thing, a homunculus that needs tending to—
did not enter American political discourse until the late 1960s. It is more 
exact to say that the founding problem of the United States was that of 
political identification.”169 There is a difference between employing personal 
identities for power and policy gains—for example, obtaining specific rights                                                         
164  Hunter, supra note 56, at 5–6.  
Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan first described ethnic groups as also being interest 
groups. In Beyond the Melting Pot, they argued that ethnicity operated on two tracks: cultural 
and political. Ethnic communities were in a continuing process of regeneration, regardless of 
intermarriage or cultural assimilation, because central political concerns endured. An individual 
was connected to a community not only by ties of blood, marriage, or personal history, but also 
“by ties of interest. The ethnic groups in New York are also interest groups.” Glazer and 
Moynihan sought to incorporate ethnicity into a model of interest-driven pluralism. In effect, 
they merged ethnicity, along with political and economic demands, into the interest group 
framework.  
Id. (citing NATHAN GLAZER & DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, BEYOND THE MELTING POT 17 (1963)). 
165  BRAIDOTTI, supra note 1, at 2337. 
166  See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE SUBJECT & POWER, in THE ESSENTIAL FOUCAULT 126–44 (Paul Rainbow 
& Nikolas Rose eds., 1994); MICHEL FOUCAULT, OMNES ET SINGULATIM: TOWARD A CRITIQUE OF 
POLITICAL REASON, in THE ESSENTIAL FOUCAULT 182. 
167  LILLA, supra note 125, at 10. 
168  Krug, supra note 31, at 1295; see generally Molly S. Mcusic & Michael Selmi, Postmodern Unions: 
Identity Politics in the Workplace, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1339 (1997). 
169  LILLA, supra note 125, at 62. 
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via the policy making process under the auspices of an entire class of people 
that are grouped under an identity rubric as posited by elite stakeholders—
and the notion of identification with a restrictive formal identity-based 
ideology.170 A negative effect of basing representation on identity-based 
factions is that the subjects’ complexity is reduced to simplified politicized 
traits that emphasize what identity elites feel are the most salient facets and 
aspects of an identity in order to harness power.171 The politicized identity-
based subject, emplaced within the confines of formal politicized identity, is 
encouraged to engage “with the world and politics for the limited aim of 
understanding and affirming what one already is”172 as defined by identity 
elites and entrepreneurs that control public discourse vis-à-vis what 
members actually want or need, the criteria of inclusion, and exclusion for 
membership and “proper” conduct in the public and policy realms. 
The problem of representation appears when the question is asked: 
who exactly articulates, sets, defines, and pursues an agenda in the name of 
the identity group? What are the power dynamics involved—how are 
membership, experience, interests, and rights conceptualized, and for whom 
and why? Is it really the case that identity groups are able to facilitate 
authentic representation of the diversity of members that fall under the 
classification of a formal politicized identity?  
The notion of a group right requires the existence of an 
identifiable group having an identifiable commonality of 
pursuits or objectives, which may be regarded as the bearer, or 
subject, of the right. Thus, a group right implicitly ascribes to 
group members some type of unified identity—which creates an 
inconsistency, or tension, between a denial of essentialist 
premises and an affirmation of group-based rights.173  
The issues posited as being of importance to the group—the defining of 
interests, policies, goals, and rights—are all tied into identity and into the                                                         
170  See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 586 
(1990). In the case of the Black Panther Party playing a role in defining modern and Black identity, 
David Hilliard notes that: 
Significantly, Huey [Newton] and Eldridge [Cleaver] parted over ideological differences. 
“When Eldridge joined the Party it was after the police confrontation, which left him 
with the either/or attitude. This was that either the community picked up the gun with 
the Party or else they were cowards and there was no place for them.” Eldridge 
ultimately dismissed the Party’s broad self-defense package, defining the black 
liberation battle exclusively in terms of armed struggle. 
David Hilliard, Introduction to THE HUEY P. NEWTON READER 3 (David Hilliard and Donald 
Weise, eds., 2002).   
171  See Devon W. Carbado, Black Rights, Gay Rights, Civil Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1467 (2000). 
172  LILLA, supra note 125, at 84; see also Clarissa Rile Hayward & Ron Watson, Identity and Political 
Theory, 33 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 9 (2010); Nancy Leong, Identity Entrepreneurs, 104 CAL. L. REV. 
1333 (2016).  
173  Krug, supra note 31, at 1296–97. 
2020] Reevaluating Politicized Identity 61 
 
subject’s sense of self.174 This has the potential of creating polarizing and 
non-negotiable spaces wherein it becomes difficult to accommodate the 
differences that exist among diverse individuals and groups without an 
umbrella identity to build on, such as national political identity or formal 
citizenship or macroscopic ordering principles that can transcend niche 
identity policy spaces.175 Interest, like identity, is not a static state of affairs; 
interests are culled from select fragments of “current information, 
consumption patterns, legal rules, and general social pressures.”176  
Identity-based factions provide a fountainhead for political and legal 
language that may have the effect of circumscribing broader engagement in 
the public sphere. “Who is authorized to speak and about whom? Identity, in 
other words, [has become] a sort of credential of authenticity authorizing 
some to speak. It also authorized others to use identity to silence.”177 
Underpinning authorization is the fact that politicized identity is a 
normative, ethical postulation.178 As Cornel West notes, in the case of African 
American identity, “any claim to black authenticity—beyond that of being a 
potential object of racist abuse and an heir to a grand tradition of black 
struggle—[relies] on one’s political definition of black interest and one’s 
ethical understanding of [identity] to individuals and communities in and 
outside black America.”179 Politicized identity, as proffered by an identity-
based factional elite, is a normative and ethical construct. Trump supporters, 
for instance, have felt free to revel in their politicized identity (“the silent 
majority”) during the 2016 presidential campaign and post-election context, 
deploying it against opponents.180 The same dynamic happens on the                                                         
174  See STEINBERG, supra note 15; Linda Nicholson, Identity after Identity Politics, 33 WASH. U. J. L. & 
Pol’y 44 (2010). 
175  See S.I. Benn, Interests in Politics, 60 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 123 (1960). 
176  Cass R. Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 PHILO. & PUB. AFF. 3, 10 (1991). 
177  Cyra Akila Choudhury, In the Shadow of Gaslight: Reflections on Identity, Diversity, and the 
Distribution of Power in the Academy, 20 CUNY L. REV. 467, 474 (2017). 
Our society has come to the recognition that gay persons and gay couples cannot be 
treated as social outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth. For that reason the laws 
and the Constitution can, and in some instances must, protect them in the exercise of 
their civil rights. The exercise of their freedom on terms equal to others must be given 
great weight and respect by the courts. At the same time, the religious and philosophical 
objections to gay marriage are protected views and in some instances protected forms 
of expression. As this Court observed in Obergefell v. Hodges, “[t]he First Amendment 
ensures that religious organizations and persons are given proper protection as they 
seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths.” 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727 (2018). 
178  SCHNEIDER, supra note 29, at 213; see also Nicholson, supra note 174, at 46 (2010) (“[R]ace and 
gender depict relatively stable bodily and behavioral characteristics whose effects (either minimal 
or maximal) are stable across social contexts.”).  
179  CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS 25–26 (1993).  
180  [During the 2016 campaign, in] North Carolina, a 78-year-old man recently punched a black 
protester in the face and said he wanted to kill him; a rally in Chicago was canceled outright 
because of scuffles between Trump supporters and protesters; a man was punched and kicked 
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ideological left as well. Irrespective of ideological and normative 
predispositions, “[i]dentity politics can dampen or smother democratic 
political freedom.”181  
Essentialism, that is, the notion that there are objective elements, 
components that comprise identarian experience, is another facet of formal 
politicized identity that has repercussions for representational politics.  
[Essentialism] is embedded in the practice of elites who seek to 
establish and maintain a position as “spokesmen” or “advocates 
for” one or another “affinity group.” And it is embedded in the 
practice of some rank and file “members” of such groups who, 
by means of group opinion, seek to keep other “members” in 
line.182  
Essentialism is reductivist and tends to “one-dimensionalize” individual 
subjects and sub-groups within a larger umbrella identity group.183 Humans 
are complex; individually and collectively, they possess multidimensional 
facets that comprise a singular being. An individual has layers of identity-
based influences and meanings. Humans are “multi-identificational.”184 
Layer in the power-based and interest-based motives that undergird 
formulations of politicized identity in the political realm and these complex 
dimensions become attenuated. Identity becomes an organizing device and 
mechanism, by which to classify, name, and place subjects in hierarchical and 
clearly defined trait- and experience-based modalities that are constitutive of 
an objective identity-based state of affairs.  
In our modern identity politics, it seems that trait-based criteria and 
experience are deemed to reflect the presence of a deep-seated identity that 
persists in space and time. This may be problematic in light of the shifting, 
malleable, and plastic nature of social context and the sociality of facts, 
epistemology, and the truth regimes that emerge from them. Thought, 
conduct, and discourse thus seem to reflect a persistence of memory when it 
comes to identity and not the fact that signifiers are arbitrary and subject to                                                         
repeatedly during an Arizona rally . . . . Trump leverages the power of this violence—he . . . 
said that if he isn’t nominated at the Republican Convention in July, “I think you’d have riots.” 
Along with the fighting, though, something inspirational seems to be happening among the 
assembled—a sense of collective identity being discovered. In this millionaire cosmopolitan 
who has married two immigrants, the threatened silent American majority has found its 
champion. 
Clare Malone, Why Donald Trump? A Quest to Figure Out What’s Happening in America, FIVE 
THIRTY EIGHT (Mar. 23, 2016), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-donald-trump/. 
181  Richard D. Parker, Five Theses on Identity Politics, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 54, 54 (2006). 
182  Id. at 56. 
183  See Daniel R. Ortiz, Creating Controversy: Essentialism and Constructivism and the Politics of Gay 
Identity, 79 VA. L. REV. 1833 (1993). 
184  DAVID R. JARRAWAY, WALLACE STEVENS AMONG OTHERS: DIVA-DAMES, DELEUZE, AND AMERICAN 
CULTURE 165 (2015). 
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modification, disbandment, or reconfiguration. “Modern power requires 
increasingly narrow categories through which it analyzes, differentiates, 
identifies, and administers individuals.”185 Enter politicized identity. It is a 
powerful mechanism that stems from “politics of language and speech” by 
which to order, classify, name, place, and police discourse, proper expression 
of interests, policy, goals, quality of life, and group criteria and conduct.186 
Identity discourse thus interjects realness into classification, a persistent 
trace of objective identity that resides deep in the recesses of the subject. This 
is part of the process wherein an organic identity emerges, where the 
sociality, the relative subjective of constructs, is discarded—irrespective of 
the intent of the elite that articulate it.187  
Politicized identity has the effect of coding the content of thought, 
speech, and conduct, and qualifying who speaks, when, why, and how about 
the interests, goals, issues, challenges, etc., which are vital to an identity-
based group’s political wellbeing and public policy goals and aspirations.188 
Identity-based politics is a composite of a multiplicity of discourses rather 
than a singular one, and in a particular interpretation of identity, many 
competing voices, iterations, and permutations are shut out from the political 
process.189 Politicized identity discourse, which transforms identity into a 
politicized mechanism and construct, provides “an analytical, visible, and 
permanent reality; a principle of classification and intelligibility. . . . The 
strategy behind this dissemination [is] to strew reality with [such principles] 
and incorporate them into the individual.”190  
Politicized identity is a construct that is propagated from within the 
political realm. Facts are politicized, and thus facts can be appropriated in 
the service of a politico-ideological program. The reality posited by politicized 
facts that tell a specific narrative gleaned from a set of interpreted facts leads 
to a conflation between objective and subjective facts. As a protestor in 
Greenville, South Carolina stated in remonstrating drag queens reading 
stories to children in the local public library: “I don’t see why their rights 
should trump ours. It always seems in society today that’s what happens. 
They want to be considered the victim; they want to have special rights.”191 
The facts change based on the identarian lens applied: story time with drag 
queens can also be factually seen as an inclusive affair that embraces                                                         
185  Michel Foucault, in NORTON ANTHOLOGY, supra note 1, at 1392 (biographical and analytical 
introduction). 
186  Foucault, The History of Sexuality, in NORTON ANTHOLOGY, supra note 1, at 1421. 
187  Id. at 1423. 
188  Id. at 1429. 
189  One critic has claimed that identity politics and the politics of identification have created a 
“pseudo-politics of self-regard and increasingly narrow and exclusionary self-definition.” LILLA, 
supra note 125, at 10.  
190  Foucault, supra note 186, at 1437. 
191  George Pierpoint, Drag Queen Story Hour in America’s Bible Belt, BBC NEWS (Feb. 20, 2019), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-47203976. 
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diversity rather than as an assault on the particular values and norms of the 
community. Politicized identity thus provides a singular account of facts and 
seeks to disqualify competing discourses.  
[I]dentity is contingent, neither the exclusive product of 
individual choice nor the natural result of ascriptive racial or 
gender characteristics or cultural heritage. Instead . . . 
identities are conferred historically: “subjects are produced 
through multiple identifications, . . . [and] the project of history 
is not to reify identity but to understand its production as an 
ongoing process of differentiation, . . . subject to redefinition, 
resistance and change.” The point is that identity is not a given: 
it is produced. Individuals’ identities are the product of both the 
social forces that surround them and the identity labels that are 
imposed on them and, to some degree, internalized by them. 
Therefore, groups cannot be conceived of as categorically 
distinct, because group boundaries themselves must vary as 
persons shape their identities through interactions with other 
groups and persons.192 
Overall, politicized identity may have a negative impact on 
representation and the positing of an American political community because 
it blurs the distinction between truth and meaning, subjectivity, and 
objectivity. There is a crucial distinction between meaning and truth:  
Meaning attends to the significance we as humans attach to our 
actions and existence, whereas truth refers to basic conditions 
of existence within which our actions and our efforts to attain 
meaning take place. . . . [T]ruth is irrelevant, even dangerous, 
in the political sphere. In that sphere, citizens argue about 
things, often about the best course of action for the collective to 
undertake. . . . [T]he things we argue about have no right or 
wrong answer.193  
When politicized identity becomes the singular or primary basis of 
performance, then the political becomes contestation for truth(s), not 
meaning, and groups are locked into internal and external contests for 
positing the correct identity interpretation to undergird and structure law 
and policy. Truth compels, “and that is why it has no place in the political, 
which deals with uncertain matters open to debate.”194 Identity as an 
ideological program puts forth truth in place of meaning and creates 
narrowly defined conduits in which to articulate policy spaces.                                                          
192  Krug, supra note 31, at 1292, 1296. 
193  Hannah Arendt, in NORTON ANTHOLOGY, supra note 1, at 1168 (biographical and analytical 
introduction).  
194  Id. at 1169. 
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The conflation of the personal with the public sphere of identity creates 
issues for representational politics on a macroscopic level of analysis. 
Identity, when explicitly politicized, does not become a means to an end but 
rather an end itself. Politicized identity has the potential to emphasize 
contestation and make it the centerpiece of policy, and the for-or-against 
posture toward other groups can have an adverse effect on representation.195 
It is important to keep in mind the levels on which politicized identity 
operates: the micro and the macro, the individual and the collective, the 
universal and the multifaceted view of identity and a national community. 
Identity can become a medium of productivity, that is, obtaining specific 
policy results, and in doing so can adversely affect the subgroups and 
individuals that fall within the group as classified by elites that put forth and 
operationalize an identity for policy purposes. “[A] common set of interests . . 
. may or may not be racially based, and those who support them may or may 
not be racially similar. Race, in this sense, becomes a political, not a 
biological cue. It is chosen, not inherited.”196 
 
VI. SELECT CONCLUSIONS  
 
Politicized identity has played a profound role in the development of 
the American political and legal process since the inception of the United 
States as a political unit. Politicized identity and identity-based factions have 
been with us since the beginning. In The Federalist, for instance, John Jay 
(erroneously) posited the homogeneity and shared communitarian political 
values of the nascent republic:  
Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country 
to one united people—a people descended from the same 
ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same 
religion, attached to the same principles of government, very 
similar in their manners and customs, and who, by their joint 
counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a 
long and bloody war, have nobly established general liberty and 
independence. This country and this people seem to have been 
made for each other . . . the design of Providence . . . for a band 
of brethren, united to each other by the strongest ties . . . To all 
general purposes we have uniformly been one people each 
individual citizen everywhere enjoying the same national 
rights, privileges, and protection.”197  
Identity is an abstraction and a signifier that when politicized is presented as 
capturing or approximating an objective reality in which subjects can be                                                         
195  Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, in NORTON ANTHOLOGY, supra note 1, at 1171. 
196  Lani Guinier, Embracing Democracy: The Voting Rights Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 134 (1994). 
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emplaced and ordered in the service of a specific ideological program, thereby 
making a particular ideological program a nationally comprehensive one. 
Elites that promulgate politicized identity are the ones who are forming a 
political-ideological program based on its interpretation of what counts and 
what actually matters in prioritizing the policy posture and interests and 
goals of an identity group. The political program is part of a narrative that 
“was made by somebody else [not the subject; the subject] does not belong to 
the character of the story itself but only the mode in which it came into 
existence.”198  
Pluralistic identarian sub-communities are a very real and active part 
of the American political and legal process and have been successful in 
obtaining degrees of representative equity in modern policy spaces. 
Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that the presentation of an 
essentialist or organic identity as a logical and inevitable basis for politics 
and policy rests on questionable grounds, irrespective of the motives for doing 
so. There is a tension that exists between a universalist and a more nuanced 
and complex pluralist sub-communities view of what constitutes an American 
political community. Language is more than just a naming process, in that 
naming is an act of power that bestows reality, concreteness, and tactility to 
an abstraction in the realm of law, society, and politics.  
Some people regard language, when reduced to its elements, as 
a naming-process only—a list of words, each corresponding to 
the thing it names . . . [This] assumes that ready-made ideas 
exist before words . . . it lets us assume that the linking of a 
name and a thing is a very simple operation—an assumption 
that is anything but true . . . the [sign] unites, not a thing and 
a name, but a concept and a sound-image.199  
Herein is the power-basis of politicized identity, that is, the power to 
circumscribe, cabin, and restrict the ebb and flow of fluid signifiers employing 
an identarian lens. If the law can reflect a policy interest and goal of identity-
based factions’ political and ideological agenda, then the law makes it 
concrete and real, embedding identarian norms, values, morality, and 
interpretations of the public weal into the legal and political process and 
policy spaces.   
An identity signifier is sociocultural in nature. This does not render 
identarian groups or identity-based factions necessarily undesirable or 
improper in the legal and political process that undergirds the U.S. 
representative political system. But it is important to recognize some of the 
problems, limitations, and tensions that emerge when attempting to posit the 
why and how of the political process through identity-based factions: who are 
the People, what exactly constitutes the political community reflected in the                                                         
198  Arendt, supra note 195, at 1174. 
199  Ferdinand Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, in NORTON ANTHOLOGY, supra note 1, at 826. 
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U.S. Constitution in the present time, and how is representation impacted by 
the practice of identity politics and politicized identity as a mainstay in our 
modern political and legal process? The significance of politicized identity 
discourse, language, is that “only the associations [between a signifier and a 
signified] sanctioned by that language appear to us to conform to reality, and 
we disregard whatever others might be imagined. . . . The bond between the 
signifier and the signified is arbitrary,”200 that is, there is no organic linkage 
between the two.  
Expression is the crucible in which identity is formed. Identity 
cannot exist subjectively without the constitutive impact of 
complex discursive systems, one of which is expression. 
Discourses shape individual experiences of self-identification, 
in part by a process of normalization that makes particular 
differences matter. Ideas shape identity, and culture creates the 
self, at least as much as the reverse. Identity is not a pre-
discursive, biological given.201  
Indeed, “[b]ecause the members of almost any self-conscious social group 
share some practices, norms, mannerisms, and narratives, all of the 
canonical social groups of contemporary identity politics can be said to have a 
distinctive culture.”202 
Thus, identity discourse does not reflect an organic or objective state of 
affairs. It is a means by which thought is given shape, contours, definition, 
and this is an act of power.203 Meaning, purpose—identity politics seeks to 
concomitantly fix these concepts in space-time. Politicized identity is more 
form and less substance as far as providing a stable basis for representational 
politics. What Saussure says about signs, that they function not through any 
intrinsic value but through their relative position in the social context,204 
applies to politicized identity because its use-value will vary according to its 
use inside or outside political, sociocultural, and economic boundaries.205  
Identity is laden with value. It is able to be marketed in a manner that 
makes it palpable for mass consumption but also as a tool, an object that 
produces and is a product of power in the sense that it procures conformity to 
the mandates of the elites that embed their interests into the identity 
construct.206 “It is on the basis of meaning that one will be master of 
language, master of communication (even if the speech act and its modalities                                                         
200  Id. at 827–28. 
201  Hunter, supra note 56, at 9. 
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come into play in this mastery of discourse); it is on the basis of market value 
that one will have mastery of the market.”207  
  Representation may be more robust when it is less beholden to 
reductivist notions of this/that binary thinking, broadly conceived, avoiding 
the “reproduction of the self from the reflections of the other.”208 A politics of 
identity that is “not afraid of permanently partial identities and contradictory 
standpoints”209 may be a counter to the reductivist binary basis of the present 
politics of identity as it has played out on the political and legal stages. 
Politicized identity can become a method of formalization and normalization 
that can then become “instruments for enforcing meanings.”210 Political 
identity codes subjects and seeks to provide a common, organic language in 
which subjects are able to participate in a system of symbolic exchange, 
wherein their empirical history, narratives, and experiences become unified 
and homogenized to create force, energy, and support for politico-ideological 
public policy programs as defined by the elite within the group/sub group.  
Politicized identity builds on the notion that identity provides subjects 
with a sense of self, meaning, purpose, and legibility within the discursive 
matrix that constitutes order, society, and the normative, value, moral, and 
principles that are constitutive of a subject’s perception and conduct in its 
relations with other(s) and world(s). “But claims to these identities also have 
legal import, as demands for public recognition or redistribution of resources, 
cutting across domains such as employment, immigration, public benefits, 
and tax law.”211 In a 2007 case dealing with racial classification in public 
schools to allocate students in a large school district,212 the Court highlighted 
an enduring issue regarding the deterministic capacity of politicized identity, 
asserting that the Constitution forbids not simply race-conscious measures, 
but rather “a classification that tells each student he or she is to be defined 
by race.”213 
Politicized identity is an expression ideology, one that seeks to procure 
homogenization of individual subjects under an identity rubric, thereby 
conflating the unity of form and content, and that seeks to authoritatively 
establish the inner from the outer, absorb the individual subject into a 
collective identity. A collective identity is held out as weighing more in 
political calculi for influence, power, and control over public policy. Subjects                                                         
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experience themselves through the well-wrought category, classification 
embedded in a politicized identity placeholder in the space of politics via the 
politicized identity signifier. Representational politics has the potential to 
ossify under the weight of politicized identity. Politicized identity, as a form 
of ideology, “functions as an instrument of control. . . . [I]t becomes the 
emphatic and systematic proclamation of what is.”214 We should not lose sight 
of the effect that politicized identity has on the political and legal process, 
how it affects and effects notions of political community, and how conduct and 
perception are processed and expressed on the national political stage, the 
political and legal process, and in policy spaces. 
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